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WHEN PROSECUTORS POLITICK:
PROGRESSIVE LAW ENFORCERS THEN
AND NOW
BRUCE A. GREEN & REBECCA ROIPHE*
A new and recognizable group of reform-minded prosecutors has
assumed the mantle of progressive prosecution. The term is hard to define in
part because its adherents embrace a diverse set of policies and priorities.
In comparing the contemporary movement with Progressive Era
prosecutors, this Article has two related goals. First, it seeks to better define
progressive prosecution. Second, it uses a historical comparison to draw
some lessons for the current movement. Both groups of prosecutors were
elected on a wave of popular support. Unlike today’s mainstream
prosecutors who tend to campaign and labor in relative obscurity, these two
sets of prosecutors received a good deal of popular attention and support.
The Progressive Era reformers introduced the notion promoted by current
progressive prosecutors that crime is a social phenomenon, which
community services are better equipped to address than prisons. The
Progressive Era movement also sought to implement professional norms and
practices to promote the values of fairness and proportionality.
Contemporary progressive prosecutors inherit this legacy but tend not to
emphasize these professional values. The Article concludes that the
professional values championed during the Progressive Era are critical, in
conjunction with new programs and policies, to ensure that as innovation
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helps achieve social justice, prosecution remains in the hands of those
committed to fair and even-handed justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2016, “progressive prosecutors” have won elections on promises
to reduce mass incarceration and redress the unfair treatment of the poor and
minorities in the criminal justice system.1 The progressive politics of the day
have filtered into prosecutorial elections, and prosecutors are drawing on a
populist movement to fuel their campaigns and platforms.2 Their election as

1
Mark Berman, These Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now, the
System Is Fighting Back., WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2019, 4:52 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/these-prosecutors-won-office-vowing-to-fightthe-system-now-the-system-is-fighting-back/2019/11/05/20d863f6-afc1-11e9-a0c96d2d7818f3da_story.html [https://perma.cc/K6XK-F5CM]; see infra Part II(A).
2
Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 51, 87–93, 100–07 (2016) (describing how public and regulatory efforts to hold
prosecutors accountable for misconduct and abuse have been fueled by, among other things,
“public disenchantment with the criminal process,” reform coalitions and movements, and
information technology).
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district and county attorneys marks a significant break from the law-andorder approach to prosecution that dominated for decades.3
This is not the first time that reformers pursued a new approach to
prosecution. The Progressive Era reform movement in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries included a promise to overhaul an outdated, corrupt
criminal justice system, including replacing corrupt prosecutors who
belonged to the party machines. While the Progressive Era and the present
are not the only times when criminal law reform has been pressing,4 these
particular historical periods are worth comparing because, in both cases,
prosecutor elections were and are politically salient, drawing significant
attention and popular support.
The Progressive Era criminal justice reform movement had several
defining features. Its aim was to combat corruption by professionalizing
criminal justice: reformers sought to replace political cronies with
disinterested experts who applied the law to facts rather than basing their
decisions on impermissible personal, partisan, or political considerations.5
Progressive Era reformers also rejected nineteenth-century notions of free
will and personal responsibility, believing instead that biology and
environment shaped individuals’ conduct.6 Finally, criminal justice
reformers sought to bring rational business management to chaotic courts.
During this era, lawyers seeking election as prosecutors under the reform
banner, most famously William Travers Jerome of Manhattan, challenged
office holders who were beholden to a political party and dedicated to
3

See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Three Lessons for Criminal Law Reformers from Locking
Up Our Own, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1967, 1969–70 (2019) (contrasting progressive prosecutors
with “traditional ‘tough-on-crime’” prosecutors).
4
Obviously, criminal justice reform has been important at many, if not all, points in
American history. We are simply suggesting that the two reform movements are worth
comparing because they involve a unique common feature. For a discussion of the use of
history in legal scholarship, see Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case
of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-. KENT L. REV. 909 (1996). Tushnet argues that history is a form
of storytelling. Id. at 914–17. The story we tell in this article is not one of decline or
progressive victory. It is rather a story of oscillation, consistency about some things and
extreme swings in sentiment about others. A lesson we draw from this story is that as we
embrace change, it might be useful to moderate the nature of change with some useful lessons
of the past.
5
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–71
(1993).
6
See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE:
THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF
AUTHORITY (1977) (discussing the shift from personal responsibility to environmental
explanations for social phenomena); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE
REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (Beacon paperback ed. 1957) (describing a shift from formalism
to a more pragmatic, historical, and socially grounded philosophy).
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powerful and moneyed interests.7 The legacy of disinterested and
independent prosecutorial professionalism, which Jerome exemplified, is
now widely accepted, if not taken for granted.
This Article compares the new progressive prosecutors to the
Progressive Era criminal justice reformers to identify the benefits and
concerns that accompany a prosecutorial reform movement linked to popular
politics. The successes and failures of Progressive Era criminal justice reform
offer a cautionary tale to progressive prosecutors who draw on active popular
support to feed their campaigns and platforms. While populist energy lends
momentum and political will for positive change, it can also be in tension
with professional values. The Article concludes that contemporary
progressive prosecutors ought to take care not to sacrifice professionalism to
broader social justice policy goals. The Article also cautions that, although a
focus on the social context in which crime occurs is progress from the cruder
nineteenth-century conception of free will and personal responsibility, it too
has its dangers.
Part I of the Article describes the criminal justice reform movement
during the Progressive Era and its legacy. Part II then turns to contemporary
progressive prosecutors. Focusing especially on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, it highlights how progressive prosecutors have distinguished
themselves from their mainstream contemporaries and, in doing so, how they
compare with Progressive Era reformers. Finally, Part III offers some lessons
from history.
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
A. PROGRESSIVE ERA PROSECUTORS

Beginning around 1870, the progressive movement emerged to address
the increasingly complex problems of industrial capitalism in America. The
rapidly changing economy brought an influx of new immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe, as well as a migration of a large number of
African Americans from the South to northern cities. The social problems
were complex: overcrowding, increases in crime, clashing of cultures, and
more. These new conditions were accompanied by harsh working conditions,

7

RICHARD O’CONNOR, COURTROOM WARRIOR: THE COMBATIVE CAREER OF WILLIAM
TRAVERS JEROME 74–82 (1963); ARTHUR TRAIN, FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE: A
POPULAR ACCOUNT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 116 (1939).
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poverty, child labor, and more women in the workforce.8 While the
progressive movement was in no way monolithic, its proponents shared a
concern about these social conditions and came to a consensus on some
common causes and means to address them.9
One target of the Progressive Era reform movement was criminal
justice. The conditions of urban America, along with the increased
concentration of people from diverse communities, contributed to an increase
in crime and corruption.10 The Progressive Era reformers sought to address
this in various ways. This Part highlights three aspects of the Progressive Era
criminal justice reform movement that had particular significance for
criminal prosecutors: Section B examines Progressive Era reformers’ focus
on administrative efficiency; Section C looks at their faith in expertise and
professionalization; and Section D underscores their belief that crime was a
symptom of a larger social problem. Finally, Section E focuses on what we
regard as Progressive Era prosecutors’ most significant legacy for
contemporary prosecutors: their conception of prosecutors’ professional role
and responsibilities.
B. RATIONALIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIZATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE

The Progressive Era was the heyday of muckrakers, the journalists and
social reformers who sought to shed light on the corruption, inefficiency, and
evils of industrial capitalism. The most famous of their works was Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle, which described the harsh conditions of immigrant
workers in Chicago and exposed the unsanitary conditions of America’s meat
packing plants.11 Along these lines—albeit in a far less dramatic way—

8

Progressive Era reform was in no way monolithic, nor were its causes simple. For a
historiographical account of the various strains within the progressive movement, see Daniel
T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 (1982).
9
See generally id.
10
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 51–52 (rev. ed. 2002).
11
While Sinclair sought to advance socialism, his book mostly sparked upset and outrage
at the unsanitary conditions of the meat packing industry, leading ultimately to the passage of
the Federal Meat Inspection Act in 1906. See BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING:
THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION 84, 89–90 (2012) (“I aimed at the public’s heart and by
accident I hit it in the stomach.”) (quoting Sinclair); see generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE
JUNGLE (1906) (following the lives of fictional immigrants who work in Chicago’s meat
industry).
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reformers described, in minute detail, the sluggish inefficiency and venality
of municipal courts.12
The municipal courts in Cleveland, for instance, were populated by
prosecutors who knew nothing about the cases, carried no papers, and kept
few files.13 Cases were disposed of without public scrutiny. Prosecutors
whispered in the ears of the judges, who issued decisions to continue the case
or impose a light penalty, while defense attorneys drifted around the room
doing little to nothing.14 Courts were dirty, dark, and noisy, belying any
misconceived sense of the administration of impartial justice.15 As urban
planner and reformer Alfred Bettman and his co-author Howard F. Burns put
it, anyone would be left with the impression that “results are dependent upon
favor or strange influences [rather] than upon a judgment of the court based
exclusively on the dictates of law and justice.”16 Drawing on the efficiency
movement pioneered by Frederick Taylor and others, criminal justice
reformers hoped to make courts look more like businesses than government
agencies.17
The inefficiency of prosecutors’ offices, like that of the courts, made
them susceptible to corruption. The lack of documentation and the individual
prosecutors’ power to dismiss cases bred a sense that criminal justice was for
sale to those with political, social, or financial influence.18 When asked why
he did not discipline his subordinates when they neglected their cases or acted
12

See generally RAYMOND FOSDICK, REGINALD HEBER SMITH, HERBERT B. EHRMANN,
ALFRED BETTMAN, HOWARD F. BURNS, BURDETTE G. LEWIS, HERMAN M. ADLER, ALBERT M.
KALES, M.K. WISEHART, FELIX FRANKFURTER & ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND] (reporting on corruption in the criminal courts
in Cleveland).
13
Alfred Bettman & Howard F. Burns, Prosecution, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND,
supra note 12, at 83, 98–99.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 109–10.
17
The efficiency movement argued that the economy, society, and government were
riddled with inefficiency. Proponents like Frederick Winslow Taylor proposed to bring expert
management to bear on these problems to reduce waste. The movement favored
administrative and executive expertise over popular participation or control and assumed that
proper management would not only reduce waste but also eliminate most conflict. See
generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911). For a discussion of the movement, see generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE
VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); SAMUEL
HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–
1920 (1964).
18
See Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 136–38.
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improperly, one reform prosecutor in Cleveland responded that he had no
control over the assistant prosecutors, who “were appointed just as he was.”19
A county prosecutor developed a policy of keeping assistant prosecutors in
the dark about their cases until shortly before trial so they would not have the
time to corruptly drop or block a prosecution.20
Reformers insisted that the municipal prosecutor ought to be like an
executive of a large business or the managing clerk of a law office.21
Specialization, a key goal of the efficiency movement, was seen as critical to
the proper functioning of prosecutors’ offices. The reformers were convinced
that the existing system, in which prosecutors handled all different sorts and
stages of cases, had led to both corruption and amateurism. Specialization
would breed expertise while helping to ensure oversight such that no one
prosecutor could corrupt the system. Thus, as in a factory, some prosecutors
should serve as trial assistants and others should manage police-initiated
charges, while another set should deal with complaints from the
community.22 Prosecutors would become experts in their work, a key to the
impartial administration of justice, the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system, and the efficient functioning of the system. As Bettman and Burns
concluded in the volume edited by Felix Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound, the
efficient and organized administration of justice was critical, but would fail
without the skilled and professional exercise of discretion and judgment.23
Reformers understood that increased efficiency would come at a cost to
participatory democracy. While susceptible to corruption, the old model was
also fluid and informal. In the old system, complainants could speak directly
to judges, witnesses, victims, and the accused, and spoke with one another
and interacted casually to bargain for a desired result. While not all parties
were equal in this spoils system, anyone could join the fray. Reformers
wanted a structure with rules and processes, something more arcane that
would no doubt make the process less accessible. As rules and procedures
grew more intricate and were more consistently enforced, individuals
accused of crimes as well as other participants had to rely on lawyers to
navigate the system. However, the imposition of rational systems, rules, and
processes would also help weed out corruption and ensure fair results, an end
that seemed pressing given that individual liberty was at stake.24
19

Id. at 119.
Id. at 162–63.
21
Id. at 194–95; MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 7 (2003).
22
Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 195–96.
23
Id. at 196.
24
WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 30–32.
20

OF

COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE

IN
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C. PROFESSIONALIZATION

Progressive Era courtroom reformers largely targeted corruption. The
urban criminal courts had become a tool of party machine politics or, as one
contemporary argued, captive to the joint interest of municipal politics and
big business.25 Rich, well-connected parties got their way. Others were given
little attention and often had no way to pursue their complaints or defend
against allegations of wrongdoing. Progressive Era reformers envisioned
professionalism as part of the solution.26
The perceived need for professionalism extended to prosecutors’
offices. As Roscoe Pound described in his book about criminal justice in
Cleveland, prosecutors lacked competence, knowledge, and training.27 They
were chosen for their political connections, not for their mastery of the law.28
The public suspected that they were carrying on private practices while
prosecuting cases, exposing them to persistent conflicts of interest.29 Bettman
and Burns concluded that the office of the prosecutor had to be reformed so
as “to attract and hold men of ability and character.”30 Arthur Train insisted
that, at least for the top prosecutor, character was the more important trait:
“Courtesy, courage, broadmindedness, and scrupulous integrity are needed
rather than legal ratiocination.”31
The elite bar at the turn of the century looked down on lawyers who
practiced criminal law. Reformers sought to improve the image of
prosecutors to match the import of their work. As observers of the Cleveland
system explained:
The criminal branch of the administration of justice, dealing as it does with the
protection of the community against crime, the promotion of the peace, safety, and

25

TRAIN, supra note 7, at 120–22; see also O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 33–34.
See generally BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1976) (arguing in that
professionalism emerged as a way of consolidating middle class status and giving it meaning);
HASKELL, supra note 6 (arguing that professionalization became a way of addressing social
problems and organizing social activity); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1991) (arguing that the social sciences emerged as a way of recasting ideological
views of American exceptionalism); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in
the Age of American Enterprise: 1870–1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES
IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (discussing how lawyers used new economic
theories to support their vision of reform).
27
See Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice and the American City, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND, supra note 12, at 559, 622–23.
28
Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 133.
29
Id. at 156.
30
Id. at 194.
31
TRAIN, supra note 7, at 128–29.
26

2020]

WHEN PROSECUTORS POLITICK

727

morals of the inhabitants, the lives and the liberties of men, and, therefore, from any
intelligent point of view, the more important branch of the administration of the law,
has become a sort of outlaw field which many a lawyer avoids as he avoids the slums
of the city.32

Reformers understood that the chief prosecutor in particular ought to be
a professional, possessing skill and training, but also the capacity and
inclination to resist public influence. As Bettman and Burns put it, it should
not be that
the prosecutor permits himself to be carried hither or thither by alternating currents of
public cruelty or public sentimentality or blown about by gusts of popular or press
excitement. He should be the captain who steadies the boat and at the same time
discovers new or improved routes to the havens of public order, security, and morals.33

The solution was to improve the prestige and professional status of the
prosecutor’s office34 by hiring professional prosecutors who adhered to
proper processes instead of using any means to achieve conviction.35
One of the most famous Progressive Era reform prosecutors, William
Travers Jerome, posed a threat to the traditional party system and its loyal
district attorneys because he was honest and incorruptible.36 He derived his
power directly from the people and won favor with the poor and the rich
alike, posing a distinct threat to the entrenched politicians.37 As one editorial
writer explained during his campaign: “If the people want blackmailers and
other criminals vigorously prosecuted without fear or favor they will elect
Judge Jerome.”38 When he was elected, Jerome sought to professionalize the
New York County District Attorney’s office by hiring young lawyers who
were just a few years out of law school.39 He used recommendations by civic
groups, well-respected lawyers, or both to fill the office with professional
assistants.40 One observer complained, “[i]n the ould days a feller could use
his pull; now, the divil take it, to get anythin’ done you got to hold up your
hand and yell ‘Hay-vard, Hay-vard, Hay-vard.’”41

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 219.
Id. at 198.
See id. at 194.
See TRAIN, supra note 7, at 130–31.
See O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 35–36, 44, 53.
See id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 87.
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Arthur Train, who served as a prosecutor in Manhattan both before and
after Jerome’s election,42 described prosecutors’ previous approach to their
work: “Prior to the muckraking era the traditional concept of a prosecutor
was that of a bull-necked gladiator with an undershot jaw, whose only object
was to convict every unfortunate charged with crime, whether innocent or
guilty.”43 This thought captured prosecutors’ indifference to the evidence and
to the possible innocence of the accused. It also conveyed prosecutors’
excessive harshness, at least toward the working class and the poor.
In contrast, Jerome was particularly forgiving of those charged with
petty offenses, focusing instead on what he regarded as more serious crimes,
particularly corruption.44 He believed a harsher approach toward the poor
would erode his popular support and undermine the reform effort.45 But
Jerome’s bid for popular support in this respect coincided with a conception
of prosecutorial professionalism, which called for making decisions based on
a sense of proportionality rather than on popular preference in individual
cases. While a more lenient attitude toward criminals was not central to the
Progressive Era prosecutors’ mission, it was a policy advanced by individual
prosecutors, such as Jerome, who were committed to preventing crime
instead of simply punishing it.46 For instance, Jerome often expressed
compassion for defendants. Assistant prosecutors reported that Jerome
sometimes intervened personally in cases that his office had worked hard to
win, asking for leniency for a convicted felon.47
To Jerome, equal treatment of the rich and poor was just as important
as proportionality. When Jerome was elected, Train explained, the criminal
process was marked not just by inefficiency, but also by a particular breed of
corruption in which poor and rich were treated unequally.48 Criminal justice
was for sale. It was “prize ring” justice in which the rich controlled all the
fighting men.49 Another reformer argued that “our penal machinery seems to
recruit its victims from among those that are fighting an unequal fight in the
struggle for existence.”50 The populist, class-based rhetoric, however, was
42

Id. at 78.
TRAIN, supra note 7, at 116.
44
See O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 63, 70.
45
Id. at 63–64.
46
In New York, the concern about corruption accompanied a fear that prosecutors were
too soft on crime. Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1338 (2002).
47
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 120.
48
TRAIN, supra note 7, at 120–22.
49
Id. at 117–18.
50
JOHN P. ALTGELD, LIVE QUESTIONS: INCLUDING OUR PENAL MACHINERY AND ITS
VICTIMS 168 (1890) (emphasis omitted).
43
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confined to a description of the problem. The solution was not to hand the
system to the public but to conduct it with greater efficiency and
professionalism. Reformers identified the key defect in the existing criminal
justice system as the cozy attitude between prosecutors and politicians—that
is, prosecutors’ lack of independence from political bosses and the criminal
element.51
Jerome’s tenure as head prosecutor highlighted the tension between
professionalism and populism. Notwithstanding his commitment to
professionalizing criminal justice, Jerome employed populist rhetoric. In one
speech to a group of wealthy individuals at Carnegie Hall, he raged: “You
are too respectable to care about the teeming tenements and the hovels where
crouch in darkness a million people of this city.”52 But Jerome resolved the
tension in favor of professionalism in the exercise of authority. Unlike many
populists who argued that the working class should have more direct control
of the government,53 Jerome insisted that it was the wealthy who had a special
obligation to run the city well: “Every dollar you have laid by, every step you
have climbed in the social scale has laid upon you an obligation of civic
leadership, and you have failed. You are not bad people. You are heartless
people and, above all, stupid people.”54
While professionalism was the antidote offered for the ills that seemed
to plague the criminal courts, popular prosecutors could fall victim to their
own rhetoric. For instance, as District Attorney, Jerome tangled with Howe
and Hummel, the most famous defense firm in the city and reportedly one of
the most corrupt.55 He set out to destroy Abe Hummel, or “Little Abe,” who
was the underworld’s most effective advocate.56 Like a superhero battling his
nemesis, Jerome sought to destroy Hummel once and for all. Having caught
one of Hummel’s famously dissolute and corrupt clients, Jerome fed a story
to the press that Hummel himself might escape prison if he agreed to
cooperate against his clients.57 Removing an effective defense lawyer in this
way, even if he was entangled in the corrupt activities of those he represented,
hardly seems to exemplify a fair and professional criminal justice system.
Thus, while he promoted a professional office dedicated to following the

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

See Ramsey, supra note 46, at 1343–45.
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 77.
David Fontana, Unbundling Populism, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1482, 1486–87 (2018).
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 77.
Id. at 121–45.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 139–43.
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evidence, Jerome took a personal interest in pursuing his opponent, defying
the maxim that prosecutors ought to pursue evidence, not individuals.58
Ultimately, though, it was Jerome’s commitment to professionalism,
and his unwillingness to play to a populist demand, that ended his career as
a prosecutor. By 1907, the public began to grow impatient with the
prosecution of corrupt local officials.59 Instead, they wanted Jerome to go
after Wall Street and the moneyed trusts.60 Many of his own reform allies
balked as he grew more interested in rooting out local corruption than in
leading a fight against powerful wealthy families like the Morgans,
Whitneys, and Harrimans.61 Ironically, while his success was built on fair
treatment for all and leniency for less fortunate criminals, he was accused in
the end of creating “two kinds of law—one for the rich and one for the
poor.”62 The professional approach did not, in the end, satisfy the populist
demand.
D. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS SOCIAL WELFARE

Part of the professionalization project involved a scientific approach to
crime. Progressivism in general was devoted to the proper diagnosis of social
problems.63 The social sciences emerged as a popular field in part because of
the promise to describe social problems in a scientific way.64 A careful,
unbiased study of the causes of crime was considered essential to any
solution. While this seems obvious now, it marked a departure from the
nineteenth-century focus on individual responsibility and retribution.65
Progressive Era reformers observed and responded to the
interconnectedness of the social fabric. The individual was no longer

58
Before being elected District Attorney, Jerome also cut corners as a judge. As an anticorruption crusader, trailed by reporters, he would enter brothels and gambling clubs, holding
trials and cross-examining witnesses on the spot without regard to rules of evidence and
procedures. Id. at 69–71. The pursuit of professionalism did not always live up to its own
aspirations, in part because its proponents, like Jerome, depended on popular support.
59
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 252–53.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 253. While the Progressive Era was diverse and there was no one political or
social agenda, the movement shared certain themes, one of which was anti-monopolism,
which could take the form of a populist rage against concentration of wealth and power. See
Rodgers, supra note 8, at 123.
62
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 254.
63
See generally HASKELL, supra note 6 (emphasizing the increased focus on
interdependence and the need to study social conditions as a result); see also Rodgers, supra
note 8, at 124 (describing the Progressive Era emphasis on social bonds).
64
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
65
See WILLRICH, supra note 21, at xxi–xxviii.
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assumed to be in control of his actions, and the exercise of free will seemed
more a fiction than a reality to reformers.66 Crime did not have one cause,
nor did punishment have a single effect on the individual. Progressive Era
reformers believed that the stress of the urban industrial world, harsh working
conditions, and concentrated areas of poverty produced social ills.67 They
also understood that punishing individuals could have negative consequences
for the community, thereby causing an increase in the very problems they
sought to alleviate.68 For example, with a typical Progressive Era emphasis
on the effect of environment on crime, Jerome intervened in an assistant’s
case to ask for a lenient sentence.69 A longshoreman was convicted for killing
a man during a dockside brawl.70 Jerome argued that the judge should not
impose a severe sentence because the crime was a result of the defendant’s
poor upbringing, his lack of education, and the culture of street fighting.71
Not all Progressive Era reformers viewed crime as the product of
poverty, culture, and lack of education. For instance, Harry Olson—a chief
prosecutor and judge in the late-nineteenth century—linked mental and
emotional defects to crime.72 Many, like Olson, preferred sterilization and
institutionalization to social programs.73 Olson oversaw the implementation
of the “morals court,” designed to address public morality, including
prostitution.74 Once again, he and others like him used voluntary
associations, criminal sanctions, and expert treatment to address what was
increasingly seen as a crisis in morality and a social pathology.75
For the majority of Progressive Era criminal justice reformers, however,
crime itself became a way to study the social pathologies of an industrial
democratic state.76 The social explanation for crime, in turn, justified greater
state involvement in the lives of working class Americans.77 Besides casting
members of the working class as victims of poverty, prosecutors and
reformers also blamed working class culture as a cause of criminality.78
66

Id. at xxi–xxii.
See id. at 83.
68
Id. at 66.
69
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 120.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 48.
73
Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the
Socialization of American Law, 1900–1930, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 63, 63–67 (1998).
74
WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 57.
75
Id. at 176-77.
76
Id. at xxiii.
77
Id. at xxvi.
78
Id. at 138.
67
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Criminal justice reform in the Progressive Era served as one of the origins
and early examples of the American welfare state. Reform prosecutors were
not only interested in fighting corruption, they also sought to use the criminal
law as a means of social control to reform individuals and enforce what they
saw as American values in cities increasingly populated by immigrants.79 A
specialized courtroom staff of social workers and psychiatrists was recruited
to assist prosecutors in treating individuals and communities instead of
simply punishing criminals.
For instance, legislatures increasingly enacted deserter laws with
criminal consequences for husbands who abandoned their families.80
Taxpayers had not yet committed to sharing the burden for these individuals,
and legislatures hoped to force wayward husbands to at least take a share of
the responsibility. Charities and local government welfare agencies often
required that a woman file a criminal complaint against her husband before
collecting support. New family courts were established. These specialized
courts employed social workers to assess the details of the relationship and
determine whether a woman was worthy of help.81 Voluntary associations,
charities, and government agencies worked alongside prosecutors in an
attempt to solve the social problem of deserting husbands rather than merely
punishing them.82
It was not only the laws and mechanisms of government that drew
prosecutors to help solve the social problems of the modern industrial state.
Individuals also asked prosecutors to help discipline unruly children or
punish delinquent husbands.83 Reformers argued that prisons were
ineffective at deterring and rehabilitating individuals.84 Juvenile courts and

79

Id. at xxi-xxx.
For instance, Illinois made it a misdemeanor for a husband to abandon or neglect his
wife and child: “[E]very person who shall, without good cause, abandon his wife and neglect
and refuse to maintain and provide for her, or who shall abandon his or her minor child or
children, under the age of twelve years, in destitute or necessitous circumstances, and willfully
neglect or refuse to maintain and provide for such child or children, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars or more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail,
House of Correction or Workhouse not less than one month or more than twelve months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment . . . .” Act of May 13, 1903, 1903 Ill. Laws 155–56.
81
Michael Willrich, Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in Modern America, 87
J. AM. HIST. 460, 481-82 (2000).
82
Id. at 460-61. Overcriminalization was, at least in this one example, the result of trying
to force a more powerful group to support a less powerful one and to use the criminal law to
incentivize men to treat women properly.
83
WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 5.
84
Id. at 79.
80
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the broad use of probation were tools prosecutors and judges used to avoid
punishment but still address social ills.85
The state expanded through its criminal laws to address the social
problems of the urban industrial state. Progressive social thought emphasized
both the interdependent nature of society as well as the critical role that
experts and professionals play in understanding and addressing social
problems. Thus, reformers sought to bring professionalism to the criminal
justice system not only to rationalize it but also to calibrate it to address these
problems rather than punish individuals, who were increasingly seen as the
product of social conditions rather than lone instigators of bad acts.
E. THE LEGACY OF PROSECUTORIAL PROFESSIONALISM

The Progressive Era influenced criminal justice in various ways. One
prominent legacy of the reformers is the cooperative, voluntary association
between prosecutors, private organizations, and the state. Today, many cities
have drug courts, family courts, and other specialized tribunals where
prosecutors work with communities through social workers, mental health
professionals, and others. But our focus here is on the reformers’ influence
on the idea of the role and responsibilities of criminal prosecutors.
The idea of public prosecution, exemplified by William Travers Jerome
and others in the Progressive Era, was not wholly innovative. The
professional ideal of prosecutors as quasi-judicial officials meting out evenhanded justice, without fear or favor, based on the evidence and a sense of
proportionality, finds expression in nineteenth-century court opinions and
other writings on the prosecutorial duty to seek justice.86 However, as
illustrated by the New York County District Attorney’s office, into which
Jerome stepped, early twentieth-century prosecutors often ignored—or at
best paid lip service to—this ideal.87 Moreover, the professional ideal was
itself underdeveloped. For example, Carolyn Ramsey’s history of nineteenthcentury prosecution suggests that even those who accepted the notion that
prosecutors ought to be politically neutral did not necessarily agree that
prosecutors, as representatives of the government, should serve the broader
public interest as opposed to serving victims directly.88 Progressive Era
prosecutors significantly advanced earlier professional norms, in part
because of the sharpness and visibility of their break with their predecessors.

85

Id. at 66-68, 81-82.
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?”, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
612-14 (1999).
87
See supra Part (I)(B).
88
Ramsey, supra note 46, at 1342-51.
86
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The Progressive Era ideals of criminal prosecution included various
related concepts—for example, that prosecutors do not take direction from,
or serve the interests of, private parties; that prosecutors serve the public, not
the parochial interests of their political parties or patrons; and that
prosecutors pursue justice in a disinterested manner, exercising power based
on the law and evidence, not personal whim. Later writings reiterated and
expanded on these concepts. For example, in a much-quoted 1935 opinion,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that prosecutors represent “a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”89 Then-Attorney
General Robert Jackson further explained this concept in a 1940 published
speech to federal prosecutors that is also cited often.90 In 1953, the U.S.
Department of Justice began codifying its internal policies and practices in a
manual for federal prosecutors to promote consistent enforcement of federal
criminal law in accordance with accepted principles.91 In 1958, in an
influential report on lawyers’ role in the adversarial process, Lon Fuller and
John D. Randall emphasized that public prosecutors differ from lawyers with
private clients in that they are “possessed . . . of important governmental
powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of
impartial justice.”92
A decade later, the American Bar Association published the first edition
of the Prosecution Function Standards (now in its fourth edition), reflecting
a professional consensus about how prosecutors should run their offices and
exercise their authority.93 Since then, contemporary codifications of
89

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3-6
(1940) (explaining that federal prosecutors should be animated by “the spirit of fair play and
decency,” “should have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of all groups in
his community,” and is required “to select the cases for prosecution and to select those in
which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most
certain,” and that “[a]lthough the government technically loses its case, it has really won if
justice has been done”). On the enduring significance of Jackson’s speech, see generally
Charles R. Wilson, “That Justice Shall Be Done”—Constitutional Requirements, Ethical
Rules, and the Professional Ideal of Federal Prosecution, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 111 (2015).
91
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, tit. 2 (1953),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/usam/1953/title2criminaldivision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4HR-69F2].
92
Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958).
93
See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of
Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 10 (2009)); see generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
90
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professional conduct rules for the legal profession have referred to
prosecutors’ responsibility to use their discretionary power fairly.94 These
writings are a significant part of the framework for contemporary
understandings of prosecutorial independence, neutrality, and detachment.95
While it is hard to trace specific features of modern-day prosecution directly
to the Progressive Era reform movement, most prosecutors, courts, and the
public now accept certain Progressive Era ideals with little question.
As the twentieth century progressed, professionalism and expertise
supplanted political favoritism and cronyism in prosecutors’ offices.
Although prosecutors still occasionally abuse their authority, and there is
evidence that entire offices have a abandoned professional norms and
processes,96 the outright corruption of public prosecutors’ offices—with
lawyers who are either completely ineffective or in the pocket of politicians
or wealthy business interests—is far more alien to us now than it was before
the Progressive Era.
For elected prosecutors, however, as the Progressive Era reform
movement illustrated, there is a tension between populism and
professionalism. William Travers Jerome rose to office on a wave of popular
support for reform. He restored faith in criminal justice by implementing
policies to treat defendants equally regardless of their wealth and status and
personally advocating leniency for less fortunate criminals whose bad acts
may have been influenced by their circumstances. Ultimately, however, his
commitment to professionalism and refusal to interpret his campaign promise
as a vow to unseat the powerful and pursue Wall Street and the moneyed
trusts regardless of criminal conduct cost him his popular support. To a large
extent, the mid- to late-twentieth-century prosecutors addressed the need to
garner popular support by campaigning on their experience and expertise, not
their policies. Once professionalism became an established qualification for
office, prosecutors could turn their fidelity to professional expectations into
a selling point, thus depoliticizing prosecutors’ offices. Of course,
94

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); MODEL CODE
EC 7-14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
95
See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. U.
L. REV. 805, 844-46 (2020) (identifying prosecutors’ skill and expertise as a justification for
their independence) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution]; Bruce
A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 1, 60-74 (2018) (discussing the history of federal prosecutors’ independence and
nonpartisanship and the underlying policy reasons) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, Can the
President Control the Department of Justice?].
96
For example, in many cases, prosecutors have been indifferent to discovery obligations.
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70-72 (2011) (declining to hold a prosecutors’
office liable for one Brady violation even when the office failed to provide adequate training).
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
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contemporary prosecutors’ commitment to strict enforcement of the criminal
law, which could be characterized as a professional value, also aligned with
popular sentiment until recent years.
II.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY “PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS”

Against the background of popular unease with the criminal process,
today’s progressive prosecutors have offered an alternative to mainstream
prosecutors, just as Progressive Era prosecutors offered an alternative to
those exercising prosecutorial power in their day. Of course, the twenty-firstcentury progressive prosecutors probably have not been looking for
inspiration in the endeavors of their Progressive Era predecessors. However,
as the following discussion shows, parallels may be drawn.
Although the Progressive Era prosecutors may have had prior
prosecutorial experience, they ran for election as outsiders with significant
popular support, opposed to the conventional way of running prosecutors’
offices as marked by favoritism, cronyism, and incompetence. Today’s
progressive prosecutors have different—and less stark—complaints about
the status quo given improvements during the past century in law and society,
but they also run on a promise of change. Like the earlier Progressive Era
prosecutors, today’s progressive prosecutors advance ideas for reform that
take account of the broader socio-economic context in which criminal
conduct occurs and cases are prosecuted. They do not simply process cases
but seek to change criminal laws, institutions, and procedure. In opposing the
status quo and the political establishment responsible for it, today’s
progressive prosecutors—like the Progressive Era reformers—have sought
office by appealing directly to the people by promising to protect the poor
and to bring the rich and powerful to justice. Consequently, today’s
progressive prosecutors, like their Progressive Era predecessors, have faced
considerable backlash from the political establishment.
This Part begins in Section A by offering a short review of relevant
developments in criminal justice during the past fifty years. Section B then
describes the contemporary progressive prosecution movement. Section C
focuses particularly on progressive prosecutors’ approach to the exercise of
discretion and how their approach differs from that of today’s mainstream
prosecutors, whose ideas of professionalism are a legacy of the Progressive
Era. Notwithstanding differences in approach that may look significant from
a contemporary perspective, today’s mainstream and progressive prosecutors
share fundamental understandings that, from a historical perspective,
probably make them more alike than different. Sections B and C each draw
parallels to the earlier Progressive Era movement.
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A. FRAMING THE NEW PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION MOVEMENT

Historians of twentieth-century criminal justice in America have
documented an increasingly punitive system. Beginning in the 1970s,
politicians responded to the increases in the national crime rate to promote a
more aggressive approach to crime.97 Since then, the country has witnessed
an increase in the rate of incarceration, disproportionately affecting AfricanAmerican men and other minorities.98 In many, if not all, of these accounts,
prosecutorial discretion played a dominant role in these trends.99
As the country witnessed these changes, there was a historical turn
against experts and professionals from both the left and the right.100 Scholars,
the popular press, and others questioned the Progressive Era assumption that
experts and professionals would seek truth and transcend political or personal
interest. Skeptics argued that professionals are all political actors, subject to
bias,101 and all have their own professional self-interest driving their
decisions.102
In the political arena, the innocence movement, #MeToo, and Black
Lives Matter have popularized some critical aspects of criminal justice.103
The innocence movement has exposed the fact that some defendants serving
long sentences are not guilty. This movement simultaneously demonstrated
that prosecutors abuse their discretion at times, contributing to this
injustice.104 The #MeToo movement focused public attention on inequality
97

See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216 (2011).
ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 5 (2016); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE
LAW 21-22 (1997).
99
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017); Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End
Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1070-78 (2016).
100
Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649,
665-68 (2016).
101
Id. at 666.
102
Id.; see also Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807,
811-14 (2017) (arguing that the neo-liberal notion of lawyers as market actors neglects the
ways in which the professional form contributes significant value to society).
103
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 87-93; Lara Bazelon & Aya Gruber, #MeToo
Doesn’t Always Have to Mean Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/03/02/opinion/metoo-doesnt-always-have-to-mean-prison.html
[https://perma.cc/DK86-H5XU].
104
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Contribution to Wrongful Convictions, in
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 109, 114-118
(Allison D. Redlich, James R. Acker, Robert J. Norris & Catherine L. Bonventre, eds., 2014);
New Report: Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug.
25, 2010), https://www.innocenceproject.org/new-report-prosecutorial-misconduct-and-wron
gful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/22QC-QCLX].
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in the criminal justice system by protesting the under-enforcement of rape
and sexual assault, particularly by wealthy white men. Finally, Black Lives
Matter drew attention to the unequal and often dehumanizing treatment of
black men by law enforcement.
Thus, the contemporary progressive prosecution movement comes on
the heels of concerns about mass incarceration, an increasing distrust of
professionals and experts of all sorts, and a political focus on inequality in
the criminal justice system. The movement is also accompanied by a growing
chorus of scholars who believe the solution to criminal justice problems is
handing over control to local communities.105
B. THE RISE OF THE NEW PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION MOVEMENT

By late 2019, a number of elected prosecutors across the United States
came to be known as “progressive prosecutors.”106 These included
prosecutors elected in Boston, Brooklyn, Kansas City, Philadelphia, and San
Francisco.107 But not all were from the North or from big cities. So-called
progressive prosecutors have been elected in Dallas, Houston, Orlando, San
Antonio and localities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, among other
places.108 In general, beginning in 2015, their campaigns have been funded
105
See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129–65 (2012); Josh
Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1666-67 (2017); Joshua Kleinfeld,
Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1397–1401 (2017);
Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Though Contestation and Resistance, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1622–23 (2017). For a critique of this solution, see John Rappaport,
Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739–809
(2020).
106
Berman, supra note 1.
107
See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=3479165) [https://perma.cc/J4EY-4VZC] (identifying Larry Krasner
(Philadelphia), Kim Foxx (Chicago), Marilyn Mosby (Baltimore), Rachael Rollins (Boston),
Chesa Boudin (San Francisco), and John Creuzot (Dallas)); Emily Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky,
There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-theirjustice-systems.html [https://perma.cc/Y56Z-DNU6] (identifying Mark Dupree (Kansas City)
and others as “new, progressive prosecutors”); Sam Resiman, The Rise of the Progressive
Prosecutor, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1145615/therise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/68SN-TSS7] (identifying Wesley Bell
(St. Louis), Rachael Rollins (Boston), and Larry Krasner (Philadelphia) as “part of a new wave
of progressive prosecutors”).
108
Bellin, supra note 107; Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing
Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1, 18, 23 (2019) (identifying Aramis
Ayala (Orlando), Scott Colom (Mississippi), and others as progressive prosecutors); Bazelon
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by a consortium led by George Soros, as part of a broader criminal justice
reform effort.109
It is not entirely clear when these twenty-first-century prosecutors were
first labeled as progressives, or when the label became popular. It is certainly
not meant as a reference to Progressive Era prosecutors. Prior to 2015, the
term “progressive” was used conceptually to characterize liberal, reformoriented prosecutors.110 Since then, it has come to be used to describe an
identifiable group of elected prosecutors. A 2015 interview with Kim Foxx
before her election in Chicago referred to two of the first Soros-backed
prosecutors—Scott Colom of Mississippi and James Stewart of Caddo
Parish, Louisiana—as “progressive prosecutors.”111 In a 2017 article, David
Sklansky offered ten “‘best practices’ for . . . progressive district
& Krinsky, supra note 107 (stating the progressive prosecutors were elected in five Texas
cities, including Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio); Virginia’s Newly Elected Progressive
Prosecutors, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, https://www.americanprogress.org/events/2019/12/10
/478594/virginias-newly-elected-progressive-prosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/7Z93-7NUM]
(identifying newly-elected prosecutors of Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudoun Counties); Alex
Yablon, The Suburbs Aren’t Scared of Criminal Justice Reform, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2010, 5:18
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/virginia-suburbs-progressive-prosecutors.h
tml [https://perma.cc/P5CZ-856H] (“In 2019, progressive prosecutors swept Democratic
primary and general elections in the prosperous suburbs of northern Virginia: Fairfax,
Loudoun, and Prince William counties as well as the city of Arlington.”); see also infra note
130 and accompanying text.
109
See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 79, 83 (2019); Scott Bland, George Soros’
Quiet Overhaul of the U.S. Justice System, POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:25 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-justice-reform-227519
[https://perma.cc/JW3U-CSPL] (discussing Soros’s support for “district attorney campaigns
in Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico and Texas”); Paige St. John & Abbie
VanSickle, Here’s Why George Soros, Liberal Groups Are Spending Big to Help Decide
Who’s Your Next D.A., L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-prosecutor-campaign-20180523-story.html
[https://perma.cc/ED2V-6WYP] (discussing Soros’s support for district attorney campaigns
in California).
110
Before then the term was not used to describe an identifiable group of elected
prosecutors, but to describe subordinate or chief prosecutors who were out-of-step with
mainstream, tough-on-crime prosecutors in that they supported liberal criminal justice policies
or practices. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 114–19 (2009)
(asking “what happens to progressive prosecutors?” and explaining that “[p]eople who go into
prosecution with a progressive agenda get derailed”); Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why
Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2356
(2013) (“Progressive prosecutors could establish their own association to advance their
perspectives.”).
111
Leon Neyfakh, Why Did It Take More Than a Year to Charge the Officer Who Shot
Laquan McDonald?, SLATE (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:41 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2
015/11/laquan-mcdonald-kim-foxx-on-why-anita-alvarez-mishandled-the-jason-van-dykecase.html [https://perma.cc/2PJ4-WSUM].
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attorneys.”112 In her 2019 book on the prosecution reform movement, Emily
Bazelon described the victors as “[r]eform-minded prosecutors,”113 but
others described these nontraditional elected prosecutors and their likeminded colleagues as “progressive prosecutors.”114 The label stuck, although
some prosecutors in the group might not claim to be “progressive” and
others’ claims might be contested.115
There is not complete agreement on what distinguishes progressive
prosecutors from their mainstream contemporaries.116 Jeffrey Bellin
distinguishes progressive prosecutors from “traditional by-the-book
prosecutor[s],” in how progressive prosecutors employ the power of
“prosecutorial lenience” to “serve as a check on the [criminal justice]
system’s severity by counteracting overly-punitive police, legislatures,
judges, and juries . . . .”117 This, however, is not necessarily as sharp of a
break with the status quo as progressive prosecutors suggest on the campaign
trail. Bellin notes that mainstream prosecutors customarily decline to
prosecute some minor offenders in order to conserve resources. He argues
that when progressive prosecutors adopt controversial policies to decline to
prosecute “[m]inor crimes that are extremely common, like drug possession,
trespassing, and loitering . . . apart from the rhetoric surrounding those
decisions, the distinction is one of degree rather than kind.”118 Bellin also
observes that, rhetorically, progressive prosecutors adopt a “‘populist justice’
approach that attempts to mold discretionary decisions to accord with
112
David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 UC DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 25, 28–42 (2017), https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/online/vol50/Sklansky.pdf
[https://perma.cc/58DL-T92F].
113
BAZELON, supra note 109, at xxix.
114
Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 750–51
(2018) (referring to Krasner, Foxx, Ogg, and Rollins).
115
See David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors,
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 653 (2017) (noting “how difficult it can be to say what makes a
prosecutor ‘progressive’”); see also Zach Despart & Samantha Ketterer, Saying Ogg Not
Progressive Enough, TOP Endorses Dem Challenger Audia Jones, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Jan.
20, 2020, 8:12 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Saying-Ogg-not-progressive-enough-TOP-endorses-14990286.php [https://perma.cc/UX2N6S7Q].
116
See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3542792) [https://perma.cc/X4SY-F6GP]; Sklansky, supra note 115, at 667 (observing that
“[t]he prosecutors who have won election on ‘progressive’ platforms are an eclectic group”).
117
Bellin, supra note 107, at 26; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse,
Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2020) (“[Using] the term to refer to
prosecutors who have specifically championed or adopted prosecutorial practices that are
intended to make the criminal justice system less punitive.”).
118
Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1249–50 (2020).
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constituent preferences.”119 While the same might previously have been said
about “tough on crime” prosecutors, we, too, identify a closer link between
progressive prosecutors and their political base.
Other journalists and scholars emphasize progressive prosecutors’
campaign platforms and published policies, particularly insofar as they are
meant to redress over-incarceration and racial bias in the criminal process.
These include internal policies on when and how to use prosecutorial power.
Progressive prosecutors might be distinguished from traditional “tough-oncrime” prosecutors in that their campaign platforms have “included
abandoning cash bail, declining low-level charges, not pursuing marijuana
cases and closely scrutinizing police conduct, in efforts to reform a system
that they say over-incarcerates and disproportionately punishes poor people
and racial minorities.”120
Like Progressive Era prosecutors, today’s progressive prosecutors are
situated in a broader reform movement. Bellin underscores progressive
prosecutors’ efforts “to leverage prosecutorial power to achieve criminal
justice reform.”121 But progressive prosecutors also support legislative
reform of aspects of the criminal justice system over which they have no
immediate control.122 Many of the prosecutorial practices and legislative
policies associated with progressive prosecutors can be found in a 2018
report, “21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor,”123 designed to
advance the movement and give it coherence.
Today’s progressive prosecutors may be regarded as successors to
liberal and reform-minded predecessors of a few years earlier such as Craig
Watkins, the Dallas prosecutor who established one of the most prominent
conviction integrity units out of concern for the fairness and reliability of

119

Id. at 1218.
Berman, supra note 1.
121
Bellin, supra note 118, at 1206; see also Daniel Nichanian, The Politics of Prosecutors,
APPEAL, https://theappeal.org/political-report/the-politics-of-prosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/V
K4Q-F7RV] (tracking developments in the prosecutorial reform movement).
122
See Note, supra note 114, at 750 (identifying platforms on decriminalizing marijuana
and the repeal of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses).
123
FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & THE JUST. COLLABORATIVE,
21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/FJP_21Principles_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SSL6-TYNN]. For additional issue statements from Fair and Just
Prosecution, see FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/ [https://per
ma.cc/HQ2T-Z2U9].
120
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death-row defendants’ convictions,124 Milwaukee prosecutor John Chisholm,
who was lauded in 2015 for his efforts to reduce the rate of incarceration,125
and others.126 But the progressive prosecutors are distinguished from their
predecessors in part by their numbers, their visibility, and their transparency
about their exercise of discretion. Some earlier prosecutors proceeded
experimentally by, for example, promoting diversion programs and other
rehabilitative measures, especially for low-level offenders.127 But these were
typically prosecutors who ran unopposed or faced no serious opposition and
who did not campaign on their innovative efforts.
Both Progressive Era prosecutors and today’s progressive prosecutors
come from outside the political establishment. Today’s progressive
prosecutors are also distinguished from mainstream prosecutors by their
identity, which adds to their outsider status. A large proportion of progressive
prosecutors are African-American,128 women,129 or both. Many have little or
no prosecutorial experience, instead previously serving as criminal defense
or civil rights lawyers.130 Notably, progressive prosecutors have banded
124
See Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need
Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2250
(2010) (identifying Watkins’ Conviction Integrity Unit as “[t]he most prominent and
successful model”).
125
See Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-experiment
[https://perma.cc/H5WR-SJCK].
126
See, e.g., BAZELON, supra note 109, at 80 (“The partial exceptions to harsh law-andorder prosecution, over the last generation, were a few cities like Seattle and Milwaukee with
long-serving D.A.s who emphasized drug treatment and rehabilitation rather than locking
people up and throwing away the key.”).
127
Id.; ABA COMMISSION ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES 13
(2007), http://www.rashkind.com/alternatives/dir_01/saltzburg_ABA%20report.pdf[https://p
erma.cc/D4KZ-AX8G] (discussing programs supported by elected prosecutors in Brooklyn
(New York), Multnomah County (Oregon), and elsewhere).
128
See, e.g., Eli Hager & Nicole Lewis, Facing Intimidation, Black Women Prosecutors
Say: “Enough,” MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.the
marshallproject.org/2020/01/16/facing-intimidation-black-women-prosecutors-say-enough
[https://perma.cc/Q3JR-FCTU] (discussing challenges to progressive prosecutors who are
black women, including Kimberly Gardner (St. Louis), Aramis Ayala (Orlando), Kim Foxx
(Chicago), Rachael Rollins (Boston), and Marilyn Mosby (Baltimore)).
129
See id.
130
Several of the progressive prosecutors have replaced subordinates at a notably high
rate. See, e.g., Chris Palmer, Julie Shaw & Mensah M. Dean, Krasner Dismisses 31 From
Philly DA’s Office in Dramatic First-Week Shakeup, PHIL. INQUIRER (Jan. 5, 2018, 12:29 PM),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/larry-krasner-philly-da-firing-prosecutors-201
80105.html-2 [https://perma.cc/AYR5-KLD4]; Brian Rogers, Shake-Up at the Courthouse:
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together—or been brought together—both to share their experiences and to
provide mutual support.131 Although other elected prosecutors belong to the
National District Attorney’s Association or to state prosecutors’ associations,
these other prosecutors have less in common with each other and benefit less
from mutual exchange.
Having called attention to themselves and to how they differ from their
campaign opponents or from other traditional prosecutors, progressive
prosecutors have been closely scrutinized.132 Some left-wing critics of the
criminal process have been heartened by their election133—but not all.134 At
the same time, progressive prosecutors have also become a lightning rod for
criticism from the right.135 In late 2019, U.S. Attorney General William Barr
sharply attacked progressive prosecutors collectively in a speech to the
Fraternal Order of Police.136 Progressive prosecutors have also been attacked
Incoming DA Ogg Hands Pink Slips to 37 Top Prosecutors, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2016,
9:12 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Shake-upat-the-courthouse-Incoming-DA-Ogg-hands-10802264.php [https://perma.cc/D6CG-Q6RY].
131
See, e.g., Hager & Lewis, supra note 128 (noting that progressive black women
prosecutors came to a rally in St. Louis to support Kimberly Gardner). Progressive
prosecutors were chief among the signatories to a letter responding to Attorney General Barr’s
attack. See, e.g., Statement, Fair & Just Prosecution, Statement in Response to Attorney
General Barr’s Remarks to the Fraternal Order of Police (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://assets.law360news.com/1189000/1189627/barr-remarks-sign-on-statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CAA6-KYXS]. Progressive prosecutors also joined an amicus brief
defending St. Louis prosecutor Kimberly Gardner’s efforts to secure the release of an allegedly
wrongly convicted incarceree, Lamar Johnson. Brief of Amici Curiae 43 Prosecutors in
Support of the State’s Motion for New Trial, State v. Johnson, No. 22941-03706A-01 (Mo.
Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).
132
For example, there has been considerable debate over progressive prosecutors’ policies
to decline prosecuting certain low-level offenses. See, e.g., John E. Foster, Note, Charges to
be Declined: Legal Challenges and Policy Debates Surrounding Non-Prosecution Initiatives
in Massachusetts, 60 B.C.L. REV. 2511, 2530 (2019); James M. Doyle, Why Rachael Rollins
Makes Boston’s ‘Courthouse Regulars’ Nervous, CRIME REP. (July 15, 2019), https://thecr
imereport.org/2019/07/15/why-rachel-rollins-unnerves-bostons-justice-establishment/
[https://perma.cc/4DPD-BKCL].
133
See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Progressive Prosecutor: An Imperative for Criminal
Justice Reform, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3–5 (2018), https://fordhamlawreview.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Davis-BP.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M22-XLEU].
134
See, e.g., Note, supra note 114, at 760–68 (discussing “the inadequacies of progressive
prosecution against the rubric of transformative reforms”).
135
See Davis, supra note 108, at 15 (discussing challenges to progressive prosecutors
from subordinates and from others outside their offices).
136
William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police’s
64th National Biennial Conference (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lodge-fraternal-orderpolices-64th [https://perma.cc/Z8VQ-GH46] (maintaining that prosecutors who “style
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individually. For example, President Trump accused Philadelphia’s Larry
Krasner of “let[ting] killers out almost immediately,”137 and the local U.S.
Attorney blamed the shooting of six police officers on “a new culture of
disrespect for law enforcement” created by Krasner.138 Some progressive
prosecutors have become embroiled in formal disputes with other public
officials. For example, after Orlando’s Aramis Ayala announced a policy to
decline to seek the death penalty, the state’s governor removed her authority
over capital cases.139 The Pennsylvania legislature authorized the state
Attorney General to initiate firearms charges in Philadelphia, so that the local
police can ask the Attorney General to bring charges that Krasner declines.140
St. Louis’s Kimberly Gardner has clashed with the state’s Attorney General
over her authority to remedy her predecessor’s conviction of an innocent
defendant,141 and she has filed a federal lawsuit against the city, its police
officers’ association, and others, accusing them of engaging in a racist

themselves as ‘social justice’ reformers” are “demoralizing to law enforcement and dangerous
to public safety” because they have “refus[ed] to enforce broad swathes of the criminal
law . . . [a]nd when they do deign to charge a criminal suspect, they are frequently seeking
sentences that are pathetically lenient”). Barr later announced his intention to scrutinize local
prosecutors whom he accused of “charging foreign nationals with lesser offenses for the
express purpose of avoiding the federal immigration consequences.” Sarah N. Lynch &
Makini Brice, U.S. Justice Department Files New Lawsuits in Renewed Push to Pressure
‘Sanctuary Cities’, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2020, 4:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-justice-immigration/us-justice-department-files-new-lawsuits-in-renewed-push-topressure-sanctuary-cities-idUSKBN2042JW [https://perma.cc/7XYW-6ER9].
137
Virginia Streva, Trump Calls Philly’s Krasner ‘the Worst District Attorney’ During
Rally in Hershey, PHILLYVOICE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.phillyvoice.com/donald-trumpphiladelphia-district-larry-krasner-worst-rally-hershey/ [https://perma.cc/D26V-XXMV].
138
Bobby Allyn, U.S. Attorney Slams Philadelphia DA over ‘Culture of Disrespect for
Law Enforcement,’ NPR (Aug. 17, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/17/7520
51788/u-s-attorney-slams-philadelphia-da-over-culture-of-disrespect-for-law-enforcemen
[https://perma.cc/Q38P-NJ57]; Statement by United States Attorney William M. McSwain on
the Shooting of Six Philadelphia Police Officers (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usa
o-edpa/pr/statement-united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphiapolice [https://perma.cc/KN6P-J5MN].
139
Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759–60 (Fla. 2017).
140
Akela Lacy & Ryan Grim, Pennsylvania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist
Prosecutor Larry Krasner of Authority, INTERCEPT (July 8, 2019, 4:55 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/07/08/da-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorney-general/
[https://perma.cc/UNX3-BHB5].
141
Richard A. Oppel Jr., 30 Prosecutors Say Lamar Johnson Deserves a New Trial. Why
Won’t He Get One?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/25/us/c
riminal-justice-missouri-conviction.html [https://perma.cc/RDV9-K4VY] (discussing State v.
Johnson, No. ED108193, 2019 WL 7157665 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2019)).
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conspiracy which has included securing a special prosecutor to investigate
her office.142
One of the most high-profile controversies arose out of the Chicago
indictment of Jussie Smollett, a well-known black actor, for staging his own
attack and pretending that it was a race-based hate crime.143 The State’s
Attorney’s Office, run by Kimberly Foxx, subsequently dropped all sixteen
charges against him, accepting the $10,000 bond in exchange.144 Ordinarily,
a state prosecutor would either dismiss charges entirely, enter into a plea
bargain, or in some circumstances defer prosecution with an understanding
that charges will be dismissed if no further wrongs are committed. Although
it has become common in corporate criminal cases for the federal government
to receive a monetary payment as part of a non-prosecution agreement,145 it
is unusual for state or local prosecutors to accept money (other than
restitution) from an individual in exchange for declining to bring criminal
charges. Meanwhile, Foxx stated that she was personally recusing herself
from the case because she had discussed it with some interested parties.146
But, rejecting the advice of an adviser in her office, she did not follow the
normal recusal procedure in which the court would be asked to appoint a
special prosecutor from outside the office, and instead she delegated
prosecution decisions to a subordinate.147 Later, Foxx’s office asserted that
the resolution of the Smollett case was in keeping with its policy regarding
non-violent offenses.148 There may well have been no impropriety, but
Foxx’s failure to follow the norms and practices of the office invited critics,
including her political opponents, to speculate that this result was improperly
motivated.149
142

Complaint at 2–3, 28, Gardner v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:20-cv-00060 (E.D. Mo. Jan.
13, 2020).
143
See Order at 2–4, In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, No. 19 MR 00014 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. June 21, 2019).
144
Id. at 4–5.
145
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $45
Million to Resolve Criminal Obstruction Charges and Civil False Claims Act Allegations
(Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/defense-contractor-agrees-pay-45-millionresolve-criminal-obstruction-charges-and-civil-false [https://perma.cc/3626-3YH5]; Brandon
L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2011) (presenting
data regarding fines paid by corporations resolving criminal cases with the Department of
Justice).
146
In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, Order at 6–7.
147
Id. at 6–7, 14–16.
148
German Lopez, Trump: FBI and Justice Department Will Review the Jussie Smollett
Case, VOX (Mar. 28, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/28/
18285310/jussie-smollett-trump-fbi-justice-department [https://perma.cc/6DRV-27X3].
149
See id.
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Progressive prosecutors do not espouse identical sets of policies and
practices. Nor for that matter do mainstream prosecutors—not all mainstream
prosecutors are “tough on crime.”150 In liberal jurisdictions, many candidates
have opposed incumbents or career prosecutors who themselves endorsed
policies and practices associated with the progressive prosecution
movement.151 Nevertheless, progressive prosecutors plainly differ in general
from most of their contemporaries in ways that seem evident, if not easily
encapsulated. And in notable respects, their differences have parallels to the
experience of Progressive Era reformers, who were also outsiders who
challenged the political establishment based on a different conception of how
prosecutors’ offices—and the criminal process in general—should function.
In Section C, we turn to the question Bellin posed of whether the difference
is one of degree or kind.
C. COMPARING PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS TO THEIR PROGRESSIVE
ERA PREDECESSORS

This Section examines whether contemporary progressive prosecutors
are distinctive from the Progressive Era tradition and from contemporary
notions of prosecutorial professionalism that arose out of it. Our focus is on
progressive prosecutors’ exercise of discretion. In particular, we examine
progressive prosecutors’ controversial policies to refrain from prosecuting
150

For example, Manhattan prosecutor Cyrus Vance, Jr., undertook initiatives later
associated with progressive prosecution, such as creating a conviction integrity unit; ending
the prosecution of violations, infractions, and certain misdemeanors where the individual
poses no risk to public safety; and pursuing alternatives to incarceration. See MANHATTAN
DIST. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, MODELS FOR INNOVATION: THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE 2010–2018 9, 13, 16 (2018), https://www.https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/03/Models-For-Innovation-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5SA-D5C5].
151
For instance, Cyrus Vance, Jr., the District Attorney of New York County, was
described in 2017 as “considered one of America’s most progressive prosecutors.” Josie
Duffy Rice, Cyrus Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html
[https://perma.cc/5DG9-4QN8]. Vance himself has claimed credit for “enact[ing] numerous
progressive initiatives and reforms that reduce unnecessary incarceration and end the criminal
prosecution of thousands of low-level, nonviolent offenses annually.” Cy Vance for DA,
CYRUS VANCE FOR MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y, http://www.cyvanceforda.com/page/criminaljustice-reform [https://perma.cc/ZSE7-6QBC]. Nevertheless, as of June 2020, a year before
the next election and before Vance had announced whether he would step down, he faced five
progressive challengers for the Democratic party nomination. See Jeff Colton, Challengers
Blast Vance’s Push to Jail Looters, CITY & ST. N. Y. (June 9, 2020), https://www.cityandstat
eny.com/articles/politics/new-york-city/challengers-blast-vances-push-jail-looters.html
[https://perma.cc/3W95-4MU4] (“Tahanie Aboushi, Alvin Bragg, Janos Marton, Eliza Orlins
and Assemblyman Dan Quart . . . are all are running as progressive candidates in the 2021
Democratic primary for Manhattan district attorney.”).
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certain low-level offenses and to divert certain offenders, particularly nonviolent offenders, out of the conventional criminal process and into
rehabilitative services.
1. The Politics of Criminal Justice Reform
Both Progressive Era prosecutors and contemporary progressive
prosecutors shared broad popular support and the avid attention of local and
national voters. While Progressive Era reform was complex, it included a
faith in expertise, professionalism, and efficiency, and a focus on curing the
social ills that accompanied urban industrial capitalism. Contemporary
progressive prosecutors share some of the same concerns about society and,
like Progressive Era reformers, believe that the internal processes and
organization of prosecutors’ offices need reform. At times, it seems as if
progressive prosecutors are skeptical about the value of prosecutorial
professionalism that we have identified as a legacy of the Progressive Era.152
But at other times, it seems that progressive prosecutors simply take a
different view of how to implement conventional professional values.
Progressive Era prosecutors and criminal justice reformers invoked
populist political rhetoric in their campaign speeches,153 promising to address
corruption within prosecutors’ offices and the courts themselves.154 While
professionalism was always the main focus of the movement, there was also
a promise to root out corruption and hold powerful political bosses
accountable for their misdeeds. Contemporary progressive prosecutors
similarly appeal to and draw on a popular political movement. But unlike
candidates who ran as reformers in the Progressive Era, today’s progressive
prosecutors aim to root out bias rather than political influence and corruption.
Consequently, their method focuses less on reforming internal decisionmaking processes than on altering substantive priorities that bear on the
exercise of discretion.155 Perhaps the new progressive prosecutors simply
take professionalism for granted, but it is at least worth noting a possible
tension between their populist rhetoric and the idea of professionalism with
its focus on processes rather than outcomes.
Today’s would-be progressive prosecutors’ campaign platforms address
not only considerations of criminal justice policy, but also broader
152

See supra Part I(D) (highlighting Progressive Era prosecutors’ legacy of
professionalism).
153
See, e.g., O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 77–81 (describing William Travers Jerome’s
populist campaign oratory).
154
See generally TRAIN, supra note 7 (cataloguing the anti-corruption effort). See also
WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 23.
155
See infra Parts II(C)(2) & II(C)(3).
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considerations of social policy, such as racial justice and overincarceration.156 Likewise, Progressive Era prosecutors, while focusing on
fairness and the evenhanded application of law to fact, also addressed the
treatment of offenders and the social nature of crime. Their objective was not
only to reduce criminal activity in urban communities, but also to deal with
broader social problems.157 By campaigning on their discretionary charging
policies, however, today’s progressive prosecutors seem more directly
responsive to popular race-based and class-based sentiment. They discuss
their discretionary decision-making on the campaign trail, expressly tying
their proposed policies regarding prosecutorial discretion to the social and
political concerns of the day. In contrast, although seeking popular support
by opposing establishment candidates, the Progressive Era prosecutors were
wary of popular control over prosecution decisions, recognizing that the
pursuit of popular support could distract them from their core mission of
ensuring that those who can be proved guilty are adequately punished and
others are not.
In campaigning on issues of prosecutorial discretion, progressive
prosecutors seem especially different from the many mainstream prosecutors
who have had the luxury of running for office unopposed or without serious
opposition.158 But even mainstream prosecutors facing serious opposition
have typically campaigned on their experience and expertise, not on their
policies.159 In doing so, mainstream prosecutors convey that they are at least
nonpartisan, if not apolitical.160 Much like judges who picture themselves as

156

See, e.g., Tiffany’s Commitments, CABÁN FOR QUEENS DIST. ATT’Y,
https://www.cabanforqueens.com/issues/ [https://perma.cc/AR9U-MYYP] (website of
Tiffany Cabán promising to “End Racist Law Enforcement” and “End Mass Incarceration in
Queens”). Cabán failed to secure the Democratic Party’s nomination for District Attorney of
Queens County, New York. Associated Press, Tiffany Cabán Concedes Defeat in Contested
Queens DA Race, NBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019, 10:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/elections/tiffany-cab-n-concedes-defeat-contested-queens-da-race-n1039841
[https://perma.cc/RB2M-EQX6].
157
See supra Part I(C).
158
See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
592–97 (2009) (finding that incumbent prosecutors seeking reelection rarely have
challengers); see also Hessick & Morse, supra note 117, at 1545 (finding that, particularly in
rural counties, prosecutorial elections are often uncontested, not only when an incumbent
seeks reelection but also when the office is open).
159
Wright, supra note 158, at 600–02 (finding that prosecutors campaigning for reelection
“talked about character and individual experiences far more often than they discussed the
performance of the office as a whole”).
160
In some jurisdictions, elections for prosecutors are designated as nonpartisan. Id. at
606.

2020]

WHEN PROSECUTORS POLITICK

749

nonpartisan—for example, as umpires calling balls and strikes161—
prosecutors, who have been described as “ministers of justice,”162 often
depict themselves in similarly neutral terms: like bloodhounds, they just
“follow the evidence.”163 The implication is that when presented with similar
evidence, other experienced prosecutors, as professionals, would make
comparable charging and plea bargaining decisions. What sets prosecutors
apart, in their view, is principally their skill in investigating and trying cases,
not their individual approach to exercising discretion; they avoid the
appearance that they import their own political and social policy preferences
into their work.
Of course, the idea that judges merely apply the law to the facts without
regard to their own philosophies or preferences is now greeted skeptically, if
not derisively, and the public has even greater reason to doubt that elected
prosecutors exercise discretion uniformly based on received wisdom. The
opacity of prosecutors’ decision-making processes and criteria,164 which
makes pretense hard to expose, leads commentators to decry the difficulty of
holding elected prosecutors accountable.165 One might assume that voters
will make better-informed judgments if, like magicians revealing how they
perform their tricks, prosecutors explain how they decide whom to charge,

161

See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study
in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 551 (2009)
(quoting Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings).
162
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). See generally
Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419 (2018) (arguing that
prosecutors should serve exclusively in the role as ministers of justice and not as adversarial
advocates).
163
See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Lawyers, Saying DNA Cleared Inmate, Pursue Access to
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/us/lawyers-sayingdna-cleared-inmate-pursue-access-to-data.html [https://perma.cc/QH3Q-LYMU] (quoting
executive director of prosecutors’ association: “We, as law enforcement and prosecutors, are
obligated to seek the truth and follow the evidence.”).
164
See TRAIN, supra note 7, at 135 (“How, then, are the taxpayers to know a ‘good’ district
attorney when they see one? The only answer is that they can’t.”); Bruce A. Green,
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV.
589, 595 (2019).
165
See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 94
(2011) (“When voters lack meaningful information with which to check the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, efficiency and sovereignty problems arise.”); Sklansky, supra note
115, at 671 (“If elections are to serve more than sporadically as constructive tools for
overseeing prosecutors, voters will need better ways to evaluate prosecutors’ performance
. . . .”).
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what charges to bring, and what plea bargains to offer.166 Progressive
prosecutors promise to be more transparent than traditional prosecutors.167
What some might see as their populist tendencies—in seeming contrast to the
Progressive Era promise to avoid popular influence—might be justified as an
endeavor to be as open as possible about how they intend to do their work.
Insofar as progressive prosecutors campaign on promises to exercise
discretion differently, they distinguish themselves from many of their
contemporaries but not necessarily from the Progressive Era prosecutors,
who made comparable campaign pledges promising to resist the corroding
power of partisan politics. Today’s progressive prosecutors make different
promises. For example, they promise to resist the corroding power of racial
bias. But both responded to their social context and to the perceived challenge
of fair and impartial decision-making. And to the extent today’s progressive
prosecutors avoid campaigning on how they will make charging decisions in
any individual case to instead focus on their approaches to exercising
discretion—as they generally but not invariably do168—concerns about
improper popular influence diminish. The danger is that campaign promises
to be tough on particular kinds of cases, like police shootings, can sound
almost like promises about how prosecutors will exercise their authority in
particular cases, since these sorts of cases tend to be rare and high-profile.169
2. Lenity in Aid of Proportionality and Equality
Not surprisingly, a defining feature of contemporary progressive
prosecutors’ work, and probably the most contentious feature, is the way in
which they exercise discretion in investigating, charging, seeking pre-trial
166

For a cautionary note, see Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra
note 95, at 854–55 (arguing that the public is not well-equipped to evaluate prosecutors, that
there are reasons to preserve the confidentiality of aspects of prosecutors’ decision-making in
individual cases, and that the interest in accountability may be better served in ways other than
transparency).
167
See, e.g., On the Issues, PARISA FOR JUST., https://parisaforjustice.com/on-the-issues/
[https://perma.cc/B7YQ-WHVX] (website of Parisa Dehghani-Tafti promising to “Increase
Transparency and Accountability”).
168
See Sklansky, supra note 115, at 650, 673–74 (citing examples of campaigns where
constituents wanted specific individuals indicted, and emphasizing “the risk that prosecutorial
decision-making will become inappropriately politicized, particularly when elections focus on
the handling or the outcome of isolated cases”).
169
In Atlanta, for example, District Attorney Paul L. Howard, Jr., rapidly charged an
officer in a police shooting right before his reelection. While many were relieved at the
decisions, others questioned whether the DA was politically motivated. Richard Fausset, Swift
Charges Against Atlanta Officers Met with Relief and Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/rayshard-brooks-paul-howard.html
[https://perma.cc/R2SY-X7JR].
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detention, plea bargaining, sentencing, and employing alternatives to
prosecution and incarceration. This is by no means their only distinctive
emphasis, of course. For example, progressive prosecutors also promise to
promote or protect certain group rights,170 to take measures to prevent or
rectify wrongful convictions,171 and, as noted, to pursue legislative
reforms.172 But what runs most forcefully through progressive prosecutors’
campaign platforms, positions, and the literature on which they draw is their
commitment regarding the use of discretionary authority. This is
unsurprising, since the exercise of discretion is one of the most distinctive,
significant, and varying features of American prosecutors’ work173 and
perhaps the most puzzling.174
Many progressive prosecutors promise more vigorous pursuit of
wrongdoing that—in their view—has been under-prosecuted, such as violent
sexual offenses, government corruption, corporate crime, and police
violence.175 But more consequential is their promise to mitigate what they
perceive as the excessive harshness of the criminal process. The rule of lenity
is a longstanding judicial approach to interpreting criminal statutes;176 many

170

See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019, https://web.a
rchive.org/web/20191212081103/https://www.chesaboudin.com (promising to work to
“[p]rotect immigrant rights,” to “[t]reat sexual assault survivors with dignity,” and to “[g]ive
crime victims a voice in every case”).
171
See, e.g., Wrongful Convictions Unit, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200101141322/https://www.chesaboudin.com/wrongful_conv
ictions [https://perma.cc/92N3-J7AD] (promising to “[e]stablish a Wrongful Conviction Unit
(WCU)” as well as “an Innocence Commission of Experts to Pre-Screen Cases for the WCU”).
172
See, e.g., On the Issues, supra note 167 (promising to “support decriminalization and
legalization [of marijuana use], with appropriate government regulation”).
173
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408–15 (2001). This contrasts with prosecution in civil law
countries, where the charging decision is largely a ministerial function. William T. Pizzi,
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1327–28, 1331–34
(1993).
174
See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 95, at 824–
36.
175
See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 170 (promising to work to “[t]est every
rape kit” and “hold rapists accountable,” to “[e]ffectively prosecute police misconduct,” and
to “[i]nvestigate and prosecute political corruption, corporate crime and landlords who break
laws to exploit tenants”).
176
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
886, 940–41 (2004) (advocating for strict construction of criminal statutes in response to the
overbreadth of the criminal law).
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progressive prosecutors have adopted a different sort of lenity principle for
prosecutorial enforcement of the criminal law.177
Progressive prosecutors’ lenity principle can be explained, in part, as an
attempt to minimize racial and economic injustice, exemplified by high rates
of incarceration, particularly of poor people and minorities.178 The intent to
use prosecutorial discretion to avoid disproportionately or unfairly burdening
poor people and minorities is the common goal behind promises to eliminate
or reduce applications for cash bail;179 to divert many non-violent offenders
out of the criminal process,180 including by declining to prosecute certain

177
A dramatic example is Maine prosecutor Natasha Irving’s promise to “seek restorative
justice solutions in all but the most violent cases.” Beth Brogan, How a New District Attorney
is Shaking Up the Justice System in Midcoast Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 28, 2019,
3:09 PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2019/05/28/news/midcoast/how-a-new-districtattorney-is-shaking-up-the-justice-system-in-midcoast-maine/
[https://perma.cc/5PLMH2NU].
178
See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 170 (promising to work to “[e]nd racist
disparities” which “plague every step of our criminal justice system” and to “[e]nd mass
incarceration”); see also FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & THE JUST.
COLLABORATIVE, supra note 123, at 3–14 (stating that “punitive policies [including overpolicing of poor and minority communities] have contributed to the incarceration build-up”
and identifying ten principles to reduce incarceration, including making diversion the rule,
charging with restraint, encouraging “the treatment (not criminalization) of mental illness”
and drug addiction, minimizing misdemeanors, and promoting restorative justice); id. at 16
(giving example of Milwaukee prosecutor who, after data showed that black people were
prosecuted disproportionately for possessing drug paraphernalia, “stopped prosecuting most
paraphernalia cases” and instead referred people to drug treatment, thereby reducing
disparities). Underlying empirical assumptions about the extent to which racial disparities are
attributable to prejudice and implicit bias in law enforcement may sometimes be difficult to
prove. See Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime
and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 312 (1997) (discussing how
the politically and ideologically charged debate has made it difficult to discuss, let alone
pursue, a scholarly approach to empirical data about race and crime).
179
See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 170 (promising to work to “[e]liminate
cash bail,” which “allows dangerous people with money to buy their way out while poor
people languish in jail regardless of how weak the evidence is against them”); On the Issues,
supra note 169 (promising to “[w]ork to [e]liminate [c]ash [b]ail,” and stating that “[p]eople
should not be kept in jail simply because they are poor”).
180
See, e.g., Focusing Resources on Serious & Violent Felonies and Holding 100% of
DUI’s Accountable, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/
20191220223447/https://www.chesaboudin.com/violent_crime
[https://perma.cc/QJ7H77H2] (promising to “Expand Neighborhood Courts[,] . . . access to PreTrial Diversion[,
and] . . . use of Deferred Entry of [Judgment]”).
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categories of crimes;181 and to focus on prosecuting violent felons.182 But
progressive prosecutors’ lenity also reflects a belief, like that of the
Progressive Era prosecutors, that for many offenders there are no sharp
distinctions between social problems, mental health problems, and criminal
conduct, and that the public interest, including public safety, is often best
served by rehabilitative and social services. This helps explain progressive
prosecutors’ support for alternatives to prosecution and incarceration, such
as drug and mental health treatment and restorative justice.183 Also like
Progressive Era reformers, progressive prosecutors are committed to a databased approach. They have promised to collect and release data both to show
how their policies are being implemented and to enable themselves and
others to attempt to measure the impact.184
Progressive prosecutors’ commitment to lenity has echoes in the
Progressive Era approach. The Progressive Era movement also invoked the
rhetoric of leniency, although not so centrally, and its concept drew in part
on a commitment to fair treatment of the poor.185 But on the surface, the
progressive prosecutors’ principle of lenity as the norm or presumption for
certain offenses, rather than as the occasional exception intended to conserve
resources or to avoid grossly unfair or excessive punishment, departs from
the approach of the Progressive Era prosecutors. Prosecutors have
traditionally been expected to serve a gate-keeping function to avoid
181
See, e.g., On the Issues, supra note 167 (promising “not [to] prosecute simple
possession of marijuana”).
182
See, e.g., Focusing Resources on Serious & Violent Felonies and Holding 100% of
DUI’s Accountable, supra note 180 (promising to “[f]ocus [r]esources on [s]erious [and]
[v]iolent [f]elonies”).
183
See, e.g., Replace Jail with Mental Health Care, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20191229164958/https://www.chesaboudin.com/mental_health
[https://perma.cc/P6LU-X4CY] (promising to work to “implement a comprehensive
transformation of the criminal justice system to decriminalize and treat mental illness, housing
instability and substance use as public health issues rather than criminal justice issues”).
184
See, e.g., Matt Daniels, The Kim Foxx Effect: How Prosecutions Have Changed in
Cook County, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2019/10/24/the-kim-foxx-effect-how-prosecutions-have-changed-in-cook-county
[https://perma.cc/K574-ZK9W] (Chicago’s Kim Foxx “released six years of data” regarding
felony prosecutions which showed that “she turned away more than 5,000 cases that would
have been pursued by” her predecessor, “mostly by declining to prosecute low-level
shoplifting and drug offenses and by diverting more cases to alternative treatment programs”);
Catherine Elton, The Law According to Rachael Rollins, BOSTON (Aug. 6, 2019, 9:47 AM),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2019/08/06/rachael-rollins/ [https://perma.cc/85J9XFT8] (reporting that Suffolk County DA Rachael Rollins “hired a data scientist to analyze
past performance and measure the impact of new policies, something she says no other DA in
the state is doing”).
185
See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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prosecuting innocent individuals,186 and norms of prosecutorial
professionalism have long reflected the importance of avoiding public
pressure to bring charges without adequate proof.187 But for Progressive Era
reformers, rigorous enforcement of criminal law (when supported by the
proof) was the antidote to lawlessness, arbitrariness, and partisanship.188
Progressive Era reformers expected equality to flow from a professional
approach to law enforcement. They were committed to equal treatment of the
rich and the poor, which they believed would naturally follow from the anticorruption effort as well as the focus on the treatment, as opposed to
punishment, of offenders.
The lenity rule also departs, although less sharply, from the exercise of
discretion by contemporary, mainstream prosecutors who built on the
Progressive Era legacy of professionalism. For mainstream prosecutors,
decisions to refrain from prosecuting offenders where there is adequate proof
have been the exception, not the norm. These decisions were conventionally
made on an individual, case-by-case basis, not categorically.189
Progressive Era prosecutors believed that equal treatment would follow
from the successful effort to prevent arbitrary and partisan charging
186

See, e.g., Rush v. Cavanaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189–90 (1845).
See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 95, at 838
(“[P]rosecutors have a duty to avoid convicting innocent people, which may require declining
to bring charges in light of their own professional doubts about an individual’s guilt, even if
the public is clamoring for a prosecution.”).
188
See TRAIN, supra note 7, at 119–20 (asserting that district attorneys “go bad” when
they “abandon[] the real and only test, which should be applied—namely, that of deciding
whether the complainant, come to him for relief, has suffered a violation of his rights. Once a
prosecutor gets inoculated with the virus of arbitrary power he becomes the tool of rascals, of
politicians, and of his own ambitions alike.”). But see id. at 132–33 (recognizing that a
prosecutor cannot “bother[] himself with every trifling offense” because prosecutors have
limited resources and because there are “so many statutes and ordinances that there is hardly
anybody who does not violate some one of them every day of his life”).
189
See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 558–62 (1999)
(explaining that federal prosecutors’ charging decisions depend on many factors); Pre-Trial
Diversion, ST. JOSEPH CTY., https://www.stjoepros.org/697/Pre-Trial-Diversion [https://per
ma.cc/QQ8E-E4SA] (“Eligibility for the [pre-trial diversion] program is determined by the
deputy prosecutor assigned to the case and on a case-by-case basis.”). For example, in death
penalty jurisdictions, prosecutors generally make case-by-case determinations of whether to
pursue the death penalty in homicide cases that, on the facts, are eligible for capital
punishment. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929, 942–44 (Wash. 1984) (rejecting
constitutional challenge that authorizes prosecutors to seek the death penalty in eligible cases
on an ad hoc basis); see also Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutors and Separation of Powers,
72 OKLA. L. REV. 603, 633–34 (2020) (concluding that it is preferable for prosecutors to be
transparent about their categorical policies and practices—e.g., a policy never to seek the death
penalty—rather than purporting to make discretionary decisions on a case-by-case basis).
187
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decisions. Professionalism would ensure that the rich did not get an unfair
advantage over the poor. By the mid-twentieth century, the legacy of
Progressive Era reform was largely taken for granted. Prosecutors came to
assume that, as professionals, they could avoid the influence of partisan
politics and other impermissible or irrelevant considerations when making
charging decisions, while still making distinctions based on legitimate
criteria. As a New Jersey judge explained in 1952, the ad hoc exercise of
discretion is “the everyday function of a prosecutor,” who may decline or
dismiss prosecutions for any of countless different reasons but whose
decisions “are unexceptionable if made in good faith.”190 Eventually,
particularly in urban prosecutors’ offices, internal policies governing
charging and plea bargaining decisions in recurring types of cases were
developed with the aim of providing further protection against arbitrariness
and favoritism.191
Although lenity therefore is not unique to the contemporary progressive
prosecutors, their rationale for lenity seems to set them apart. Mainstream
prosecutors have long declined to prosecute based on forensic and
administrative considerations—for example, because an offender was more
useful as a witness, because a government witness became unavailable, or
because a prosecution was simply not worth the cost.192 Many also
implemented a principle of proportionality—e.g., declining to prosecute, or
to prosecute as vigorously as the law and facts permit, to mitigate the
excessive harshness of the criminal process.193 And many also sought to
implement a principle of equality—i.e., to treat similarly situated individuals

190
State v. Winne, 91 A.2d 65, 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1952), rev’d, 96 A.2d 63
(N.J. 1953).
191
See generally Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971).
192
FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME
253–59 (1970) (discussing the decision not to charge because of the suspect’s willingness to
cooperate); id. at 159 (“[T]here is general recognition everywhere that resources are simply
not adequate to fully enforce every penal law. Recognition of the necessity for charging
discretion, therefore, is most widespread in terms of limited resources.”).
193
Id. at 186 (“Obviously guilty persons may not be charged when, in the judgment of the
police or prosecutor, the consequences of prosecution and conviction seem unduly harmful in
relation to the criminal conduct involved or the social and economic circumstances of the
suspect.”). In cases involving low-level offenders, state and federal prosecutors have
employed formal and informal diversion programs, in which charges are deferred and
ultimately declined or dismissed upon satisfaction of conditions such as payment of restitution
or refraining from further criminal conduct. See United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159,
161–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing the history and use of deferred prosecution).
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equally.194 In doing so, mainstream prosecutors have cultivated the
appearance that prosecuting is apolitical and that discretionary decisions are
made by reference to time-honored professional values and understandings.
Insofar as today’s progressive prosecutors are implementing different
charging criteria from their mainstream counterparts, it is not entirely clear
whether their approach to prosecutorial discretion is different in principle.
Progressive prosecutors might be understood to be applying ordinary,
accepted principles of charging discretion. What is different may not be how
they conceptualize their role or, in particular, the principles governing their
exercise of discretionary power, but how they see the criminal process and
the wider world in which they perform their work. Progressive prosecutors
make different judgments from their mainstream contemporaries regarding
when punishment is necessary to serve the public interest because they think
the public interest is often better served by an alternative to prosecution and
punishment. Further, they have a different social understanding about when
similarly situated individuals are being treated differently: they perceive that
implicit racial bias and structural racism pervade the criminal process, often
making it unjust to apply criminal laws as strictly as law and facts would
allow.195
Progressive prosecutors view the colorblind approach of their
predecessors as inadequate given their understanding of how racial bias
defines the system. In other words, the professional approach might promise
to treat like individuals alike, regardless of particular characteristics like race.
But a progressive prosecutor will be wary of how even this seemingly fair
approach might have a different impact on African-American communities.
For instance, a mainstream prosecutor might offer a more lenient plea to a
white defendant with no prior convictions than an African American who had
been arrested previously for a nonviolent crime. A progressive prosecutor,
understanding how policing policies target young black men, might offer the
same deal to both.
In focusing on the social impact of crime and criminal justice,
progressive prosecutors build on the legacy of Progressive Era reformers,
who introduced the notion that crime is a social rather than an individual
problem. Of course, at least some Progressive Era reformers also looked at
heredity and race as the source of criminality—a stark contrast from today’s
progressive prosecutors who would all certainly condemn any such theory.

194

Green, supra note 164, at 611–13 (“[P]rosecutors generally agree that they should not
make arbitrary distinctions among cases—that is, similar cases should be treated similarly.”).
195
See Gold, supra note 165, at 118 (“Allocating prosecutorial resources away from
small-time drug offenders could . . . reduce racial disparity in the criminal justice system.”).
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3. Categorical Presumptions of Lenity
Progressive Era reformers and contemporary progressive prosecutors
were equally concerned about two different systems of justice: one for the
poor and one for the rich. Progressive Era prosecutors believed that the main
source of the problem was corruption. Contemporary progressive
prosecutors, however, see the problem as more insidious—the result of
implicit bias and other forms of discrimination. To address the problem of
unequal justice, Progressive Era reformers primarily sought to root out
corruption and implement fair and professional procedures. Contemporary
progressive prosecutors, among other things, advance lenity, refusing in
some cases to prosecute entire categories of crimes.
Progressive prosecutors’ efforts to implement their vision of the public
good through presumptions against prosecuting certain crimes, such as
marijuana possession, are particularly controversial.196 This policy seems
distinctive not just because of its lenity, but also because of the categorical
approach to discretionary decision making in which lenity is the norm for
certain categories of criminal conduct. Mainstream prosecutors, even those
who approve of lenity, tend to take a case-by-case approach.197 In other
words, in mainstream contemporary prosecution, it tends to be the individual
that invites the forgiving treatment, not a social situation as a whole. Their
implicit understanding is that the legislative judgment to criminalize conduct,
thereby subjecting it to criminal prosecution, is generally entitled to respect.
196

Following Rachael Rollins’s election as Boston prosecutor, the National Police
Association filed a complaint with the Massachusetts disciplinary authority, alleging that
Rollins’s campaign promise not to charge certain crimes reflected a “reckless disregard of the
laws.” Letter from the National Police Association to Constance V. Vecchione, Office of the
Bar Counsel (Dec. 23, 2018), https://nationalpolice.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
DA_Rachael_Rollins_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CHK-ZARQ]. Nonetheless, Rollins
implemented her controversial pledge. See RACHAEL ROLLINS, SUFFOLK CTY. DIST. ATT’Y.,
THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO app. C (2019), http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/
The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2QR-YLLT] (listing fifteen
offenses that will presumptively not be charged, including marijuana possession, shoplifting,
and trespass, subject to identified exceptions and factors for consideration).
197
See Stuart Diamond, The Law; Prosecutorial Discretion: Worthy of Defense?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/22/us/the-law-prosecutorialdiscretion-worthy-of-defense.html [https://perma.cc/SZ3C-QNQX] (“The discretion afforded
American prosecutors is defended on the ground that it provides for case-by-case flexibility
and ultimately more leniency for deserving defendants.”); Memorandum from N.J. Att’y Gen.
Gurbir S. Grewal on Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting
Marijuana and Other Criminal Offenses (Aug. 29, 2018), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/2
018-0829_AG-Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZD6-8T8R] (directing that municipal
prosecutors may not categorically decline to prosecute marijuana offenses but may decide on
a case-by-case basis to recommend that the court accept a plea to a lesser or other offense or
to recommend that eligible defendants be accepted into diversion programs).
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Legislatures contemplate that prosecutors will exercise discretion when
enforcing the criminal law. Therefore, it does not undermine the legislature
to decline to prosecute some individuals who are provably guilty of offenses
to conserve limited resources. The prosecutor is still deferring to the
legislature because the objectives of the criminal law can be achieved without
punishment, the benefits of prosecution might outweigh the harms, or the
legislative purpose may not be served for other reasons particular to the
individual and the circumstances of the case. But adopting a categorical
policy not to prosecute conduct that the legislature has said is a crime might
seem to countermand the legislative judgment and thus comprise a failure to
faithfully execute the law.198
At least with respect to marijuana cases, one might argue that
progressive prosecutors are simply a step ahead of the state legislatures,
which is legitimate when legislatures are slow to repeal laws that become
unworthy of enforcement in light of changing social understandings.199
Progressive prosecutors were not the first to stop prosecuting individuals for
possessing small amounts of marijuana in states that had not yet
decriminalized its personal use and possession.200 In generally forgoing
prosecutions of marijuana possession, progressive prosecutors might be said
to follow in the footsteps of earlier prosecutors who declined to prosecute
outmoded victimless crimes such as lewd cohabitation, adultery, and similar
sex offenses involving consenting adults. But this does not explain why, for
example, Boston’s Rachael Rollins adopted a presumption against
prosecuting trespassing and shoplifting.201 No one would suggest that the
underlying conduct should be allowed, much less that it has become socially
acceptable. Rather, Rollins’s rationale is that public safety can be protected
more effectively by alternative approaches.202
198

Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L REV. 671,
705 (2014) (“[C]ategorical nonenforcement for policy reasons usurps Congress’s function of
embodying national policy in law; it effectively curtails the statute that Congress enacted,
replacing it with a narrower prohibition.”).
199
See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225
(2007) (“[W]hen legislatures leave out-dated crimes on the books, other components of
democratic governance compensate: politically accountable prosecutors rarely prosecute (and
thus effectively nullify) many crimes the public cares little about—and that scholars complain
about.”); Melissa J. Mitchell, Comment, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to
Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L. REV. 1671, 1680–83 (2005) (discussing the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to account for shifting social norms).
200
See Gold, supra note 165, at 115–17.
201
See ROLLINS, supra note 196, at app. D-1.
202
Id. at 4–6 (“Sweeping advances in data science and public health have revealed that
decades of punitive incarceration are not effectively preventing recidivism and promoting
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To critics, underenforcement jeopardizes public safety.203 Progressive
prosecutors disagree. For example, Rollins has asserted, with distinct echoes
of Progressive Era prosecutors, that “protect[ing] the community’s
safety . . . is best accomplished when the office first considers solutions that
direct those in need of treatment—mental health, substance use disorder, or
otherwise—to available resources, minimize court involvement, and keep
people free of criminal records and able to work and function without
government oversight.”204 There is insufficient data to resolve the empirical
disagreement.205 Progressive prosecutors may be rejecting mainstream
prosecutors’ empirical assumptions or predictions and leaving it to future
study to decide whose guess is correct. But they are not necessarily rejecting
the conventional conception of prosecutors’ role in exercising discretionary
power. Once convinced that an individual is provably guilty of a crime,
prosecutors are supposed to decide whether to pursue a prosecution based
principally on the need to protect the public and on other public interests,
such as economy and fairness, that may point in different directions.
Progressive prosecutors might argue that they are simply weighing interests
differently or striking a different balance.
Critics also challenge this approach as anti-democratic.206 While state
legislators understand and anticipate that prosecutors will decline to
public safety. A large number of criminal convictions secured by prosecutors nationally are
for drug, property, and public order offenses, which are often driven by economic, mental
health, and social needs . . . . Data show that a carceral approach to low-level, non-violent
offenses can do more harm than good . . . . As a result, jurisdictions across the country are
taking a smarter approach to punishment and accountability. Law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors’ offices are collecting and analyzing new and varied sources of data, and they are
safely beginning to move all but the most serious offenses away from carceral punishment and
its downstream collateral harms.”).
203
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1 (detailing criticisms of progressive prosecutors’
policies in Boston, Dallas, Philadelphia, and San Antonio, including accusations that lenient
enforcement policies will create “lawlessness” and a “public safety crisis” and will lead to
more crime and more victims).
204
ROLLINS, supra note 196, at app. C-1. As historians of Progressive Era criminal justice
reform would argue, however, the substitution of private voluntary organizations for
government punishment involves a shift in policing rather than an elimination of social control
entirely. See WILLRICH, supra note 21, at xxi–xxxix.
205
See Berman, supra note 1 (quoting Professor Richard Berk’s observation that it is too
soon to measure the impact of progressive prosecutors’ policies on crime rates).
206
See, e.g., Steve Volk, Larry Krasner vs. Everybody: Inside the Philly DA’s Crusade to
Revolutionize Criminal Justice, PHILA. (Nov. 23, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.phillymag.co
m/news/2019/11/23/larry-krasner-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/YK26-DUKJ]
(recounting U.S. Attorney Bill McSwain’s criticisms of Philadelphia prosecutor Larry
Krasner, including “that Krasner has ‘abdicated’ his responsibility as a prosecutor and
disrespected democracy by failing to enforce the law as it’s been passed down to him”); see
also Foster, supra note 132, at 2534–45.
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prosecute some individual offenders, one might assume that they do not
expect prosecutors to decline to prosecute whole categories of offenses;
Otherwise, the legislature would not have adopted the law in the first place.
At least at one time, it might have been considered nonfeasance for a
prosecutor to categorically refuse to investigate or prosecute certain crimes,
rather than making good faith decisions among individual cases.207 Today,
prosecutors’ decisions not to prosecute whole categories of crimes, absent
exceptional circumstances, might be viewed as a repudiation of the
legislature’s intent—and therefore the democratic will—underlying the
relevant criminal laws. Even more difficult to square with legislative intent
would be situations where prosecutors absolutely decline to bring certain
charges.208 An example is the Orlando prosecutor’s decision never to seek
the death sentence—that is, never to bring charges of capital murder.209
Bellin’s answer is that exercising discretion leniently is a legitimate and
lawful check on state power to punish, and there is nothing amiss in starting
with an understanding that leniency will be the norm with respect to certain
criminal conduct.210 Even if a state legislature does not endorse this approach,
the authority to adopt it is implicit in prosecutors’ state constitutional status
as executive branch officials. While one can debate whether any given
prosecutor is exercising this power wisely or abusively—and the electorate
can ultimately resolve this question for itself through the democratic
process211—there is nothing generally anomalous or anti-democratic about a
presumption that charges will not be pursued in a category of cases.
There are analogues in mainstream prosecutors’ work. For example, the
federal and state prosecution of tax crimes—willful failure to file federal or
state tax, willful failure to declare income, false statements in tax filings, and
the like—is surely the exception, not the rule. Mostly, the problem is left to
civil tax authorities to address. But prosecutors diverge from this practice at
times, for example, if the tax evader is a repeat offender or—as in Al
Capone’s case—is guilty of more serious but unprovable crimes,212 the

207

See, e.g., State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63 78–79 (1953) (upholding indictment of local
prosecutor for nonfeasance for failing to prosecute individuals for operating gambling
establishments).
208
See Bellin, supra note 118, at 1249.
209
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
210
Bellin, supra note 107, at 29; Bellin, supra note 118, at 1248.
211
While it is impossible to know why some would-be progressive prosecutors were
defeated at the polls, the answer may be, in part, that voters regarded their proposed policies
as unwise.
212
Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2005).

2020]

WHEN PROSECUTORS POLITICK

761

offender has a special obligation to the tax law,213 or the nature or extent of
wrongdoing is particularly egregious. Arguably, progressive prosecutors and
mainstream prosecutors simply make different judgments about when a rule
of lenity should apply.
4. Holistic Prosecuting
Finally, today’s progressive prosecutors seem different from many of
their contemporaries in their broad—if not holistic—conception of their role,
which follows from their conception of the role of criminal law in society.214
Conventional prosecutors are primarily case processors: their assigned role
is to decide whom to prosecute and how.215 They leave it to civil government
agencies to decide how to deal with the mental health or social problems that
might influence offenders’ wrongdoing. But progressive prosecutors tend to
see criminal problems as interconnected with other social problems—an
insight pioneered by the Progressive Era reformers and reinforced more
recently with the advent of drug courts and other diversion programs for
nonviolent offenders. This explains, at least in part, progressive prosecutors’
conviction that providing mental health and social services to offenders
rather than prosecuting and imprisoning them can sometimes promote public
safety at lower individual and public cost. They champion diversion
programs in which offenders are offered entry into treatment as an alternative
to prosecution and the risk of incarceration.216 This is not an innovation, but
rather a recent incarnation of the Progressive Era approach to crime as a
social problem. In turning away from a more draconian nineteenth-century
conception of individual responsibility and crime, the Progressive Era
reformers involved the state in a more intricate way in policing individual

213
See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208–09 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding
it was a proper exercise of discretion to selectively enforce criminal tax laws against lawyers
and accountants).
214
Much has been written about holistic, or comprehensive, criminal defense
representation. See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Maya Buenaventura & Paul Heaton, The Effects
of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes, 132 HARV. L. REV. 819, 819 (2019). There
is no comparable literature about holistic approaches to prosecution, although references are
occasionally made to the concept.
215
Bruce Green, Urban Policing and Public Policy—The Prosecutor’s Role, 51 GA. L.
REV. 1179, 1188–89 (2017) (“The principal objective of a prosecutor’s office ‘is to ensure the
efficient and effective prosecution or disposition of cases presented for the prosecution,’ and
some offices may view this as the limit of their responsibilities.”) (citation omitted).
216
Bellin raises issues with this approach, arguing that prosecutors should prosecute or
dismiss cases, but not create diversion programs. See Bellin, supra note 118, at 1239–40.
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lives. The welfare state itself, as the historian Michael Willrich has argued,
was born in part of this concept of criminal justice.217
While progressive prosecutors are more committed to alternatives to
prosecution and incarceration, many conventional prosecutors also employ
diversion programs. Contemporary prosecutors are involved in social
engineering in other respects as well. For example, federal prosecutors in
corporate criminal cases use non-prosecution and deferred prosecution
agreements to induce corporations to rehabilitate themselves by adopting
internal structural reforms. And “community prosecutors” have used
criminal power to address social problems, such as vagrancy, that might
ordinarily have been addressed by civil authorities.218 One might argue that
strict case processing is becoming the exception. The difference for
progressive prosecutors may simply be in how they tackle social problems
and which ones they prioritize.
III. LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Even though the two criminal justice reform movements, separated by
about a century, significantly diverge in goals and substance, progressive
prosecutors can both take inspiration from their predecessors and learn from
them. We close by drawing from Progressive Era criminal justice reform to
offer a few such lessons.
Progressive Era prosecutors such as William Travers Jerome faced the
challenge of reconciling professionalism with a movement closely tied to
popular support, and contemporary progressive prosecutors face a similar
challenge. To the extent that the dictates of professionalism lead to results
that win popular support there may be little problem, but progressive
prosecutors will not always be so fortunate, particularly because
prosecutorial professionalism often calls for making individual decisions
based on evidence that is inaccessible to the public.
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See generally WILLRICH, supra note 21 (arguing that the advent of the welfare state
was rooted in the Progressive Era concept of criminality, which justified a greater intrusion of
the government in the lives of immigrants and the poor).
218
Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of
Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 291–92 (2012) (“Community
prosecutors typically work with members of the community to identify recurring, ongoing
criminal justice problems (drug dealing, graffiti, vagrancy) and then work in tandem with
community representatives and agencies to address these problems through a project, policy,
or strategy, often involving nontraditional methods.”); see also Green, supra note 215, at 1196
(“[W]here vagrancy is the result of poverty or homelessness, a prosecutor must determine
whether the state should respond through criminal prosecutions or whether social welfare
programs that address the underlying causes will better serve societal ends.”).
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While progressive prosecutors embrace policy priorities that win
popular support, and the public may have an interest in ensuring that
prosecutors implement these policies as promised, the public is in a bad
position to assess how policy priorities play out in individual cases, even with
greater transparency. Consequently, professionalism often calls for ignoring
or even disappointing popular calls for results in individual cases:
prosecutorial decisions in particular cases ought to be made by professionally
independent prosecutors based on the evidence and applicable, articulable
principles and policies. As we learned from the Progressive Era reformers,
independence from the public and the political establishment goes to the core
objective of the prosecutor’s role: exercising discretion on behalf of the
public based on a professional commitment to assess the evidence objectively
and make decisions in a fair and even-handed way.219 But it is harder to
achieve that independence when prosecutors garner popular support with a
particular agenda.
Particularly given that strong social movements have helped propel
progressive prosecutors to victory, the public may expect charging and pleabargaining decisions in individual cases to conform to its preferences. For
example, the public may perceive that progressive prosecutors, who were
elected against the background of the #MeToo movement, abandon their
campaign promises if they fail to charge or convict powerful defendants in
high-profile sexual-abuse cases. Likewise, given the popular progressive
conviction that mainstream prosecutors mishandled cases of police violence
against civilians, a progressive prosecutor’s constituency may feel betrayed
by a progressive prosecutor who fails to successfully prosecute violence by
police, even when from the prosecutor’s perspective, the result is dictated by
law and fact. Part of the legacy of Progressive Era criminal justice reform is
that public preferences should not govern criminal justice outcomes in
individual cases, and contemporary prosecutors undoubtedly share this
understanding. But in making evidence-based decisions, especially the
decision not to charge, progressive prosecutors may disappoint their
constituencies. Conversely, progressive prosecutors may be influenced by
public pressure in subtle and unacknowledged ways. As recent controversies
in federal criminal prosecution remind us, prosecutors’ independence from
those who put them in office cannot be accepted as a given.220
219

See Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 95, at 846–47
(arguing that the primary fiduciary obligations of prosecutors are criminal justice ones, such
as the obligation to charge only when there is sufficient evidence to prove guilt).
220
See, e.g., Katie Benner, Charlie Savage, Sharon LaFraniere & Ben Protess, After Stone
Case, Prosecutors Say They Fear Pressure from Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2020),
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One lesson may be that prosecutors should discourage unreasonable
expectations. While nuance is not normally a feature of the stump speech,
progressive prosecutors today should be careful in their campaign rhetoric
not to promise too much in terms of results in particular types of cases and to
remind and educate the public about the nature of the criminal process. This
may not be easy, given that races for prosecutorial office are competitive and
social media encourages the publication of brief, popular sentiments, but
progressive prosecutors committed to the values of professionalism and
progressive policies ought to emphasize both.
Another challenge is suggested by a point of contrast between the
current era and the Progressive Era—the challenge of preserving professional
values while implementing new, progressive policies. In some offices, upon
a progressive prosecutor’s election, there has been a purge of career
prosecutors.221 This is not entirely surprising. To change the office culture,
newly elected prosecutors might understandably replace prosecutors who are
hostile to new policies and practices or encourage them to leave. But this is
where today’s progressive prosecutors might be expected to take a different
approach from Progressive Era prosecutors who had a powerful incentive to
replace incompetent staff members who got their jobs through the political
machine. Prosecutors’ offices have come a long way since then, and even
where progressive prosecutors disagree with their predecessors’ approach to
questions of policy, they are likely to benefit from career prosecutors’
institutional memory, relationships with the court, and commitment to
internal policies and practices that promote enduring professional values
(e.g., avoiding wrongful convictions, candor to the court, fair process) that
progressive prosecutors wish to preserve. While retaining career prosecutors
might be problematic in that it can slow the pace of progressive change,
continuity can also serve to ensure that professional values are maintained.222
Progressive prosecutors’ fresh perspectives as outsiders may be useful in
changing a recalcitrant institutional culture, but, given the importance of
preserving professionalism, progressive prosecutors may be better served by
converting at least some career prosecutors rather than replacing them.
In addition to avoiding all-out purges of personnel, progressive
prosecutors should be careful not to cut procedural or ethical corners in order
to obtain particular results. Even if the result is fair, the prosecutorial norms,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/us/politics/justice-department-roger-stonesentencing.html [https://perma.cc/3DDQ-BN2U].
221
See, e.g., Palmer, Shaw & Dean, supra note 130.
222
Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C.L.
REV. 523, 582–86 (2020). For a critique of the growing chorus of academic support for
democratizing criminal justice, see Rappaport, supra note 105, at 739–809.
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traditions, and ethical rules not only ensure fair results, they also reassure the
public about the legitimacy of the process. This reassurance is particularly
important because the progressive platform is controversial, and political
opponents might look for reasons to question the legitimacy of particular
outcomes. Chicago prosecutor Kimberly Foxx’s departure from convention
in Jussie Smollett’s case is a stark example, which may have done more harm
to the progressive cause than good.223 Following established norms, policies,
and practices helps reassure the public that the resolution of a case is fair.
And this sort of legitimacy is critical, particularly in a high-profile, politically
charged case such as Smollett’s.
A similar tension between professionalism and populism may arise, not
only in individual cases, but with respect to progressive prosecutors’
charging policies, such as a policy to divert individuals arrested for marijuana
possession to social programs. In advancing alternatives to incarceration,
contemporary progressive prosecutors are taking a page from the Progressive
Era playbook. But prosecutorial policies are not legitimate merely because
they enjoy popular support. While some may see popular support as
conferring democratic legitimacy on lenity policies, such as a policy against
prosecuting possession of marijuana for personal use, popular support is
neither a necessary nor sufficient justification. A lesson of the Progressive
Era, with its emphasis on professionalism over populism, was that
prosecutors should set policy priorities—for example, prioritizing corruption
prosecutions—based on the same sorts of professional values (e.g.,
proportionality and even-handed justice) that govern decision making in
individual cases.224
While diversion programs have persisted for so long in part because of
evidence pointing to their effectiveness, they are also imperfect and often of
unproven use. They may have unintended negative consequences.225 The
Progressive Era has taught us that blind faith in the association between
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See supra notes 143–149 and accompanying text.
On this point, we disagree with a forthcoming article arguing that local popular support
itself confers democratic legitimacy on progressive prosecutors’ policies of lenity. See W.
Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3542575
[https://perma.cc/FGS7-J
RFU]; cf. MILLER, supra note 173, at 160 n.21 (noting differing views on whether, and to what
extent, prosecutors should weigh prevailing community sentiment in deciding not to enforce
criminal laws).
225
See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Why Do Sex-Work Diversion Programs Fail?, NATION (Sept.
25, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-do-sex-work-diversion-programsfail/ [https://perma.cc/V6W7-QXG2] (discussing criticisms of New York City’s diversion
program for sex workers).
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criminal justice and private organizations is misplaced.226 Social programs,
such as diversion programs, advanced by prosecutors can be an improvement
over harsh carceral punishment but may still be a problematic form of social
control. They invariably involve a greater degree of government supervision
and involvement in the daily lives of individuals, especially the poor and
minorities.227 Putting too much faith in these sorts of programs, as the
Progressive Era reformers did, may lead to disappointment or to the creation
of unanticipated problems. While experimentation is laudatory, today’s
progressive prosecutors have a responsibility to follow up by collecting data
(as many have promised to do) and then by fixing or replacing what does not
work. Ultimately, evidence-based judgments about whether, as a matter of
policy, to pursue alternatives to prosecution in particular classes of cases
should be made by elected prosecutors—not by public referendum—against
the background of professional criminal-justice values and expectations, not
based exclusively on social policy preferences.
CONCLUSION
Although Progressive Era reformers and today’s reform-oriented
progressive prosecutors are separated by about a century and much has
changed over that time, a comparison between them provides some
interesting and important insights. This is so for two reasons. First,
progressive prosecutors inherit important traditions and legacies from the
Progressive Era movement, and, second, both groups of prosecutors were
elected on a wave of popular support. Progressive Era prosecutors and
today’s progressive prosecutors, unlike most of today’s mainstream
prosecutors, were elected by a politically active, mobilized, and vigilant
segment of the public. It is a sign of a healthy democracy when those affected
by criminal justice policy are active and involved in the nature of its
implementation. But, at the same time, this direct involvement can pose a
threat to prosecutorial independence. Because prosecutors’ decisions in
individual cases are—and ought to be—driven by complex considerations of
fact and law, they are not well-suited to popular oversight. Some degree of
insulation is necessary to ensure fairness in individual cases. Prosecutorial
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See, e.g., Lee Romney, Private Diversion Programs Are Failing Those Who Need Help
the Most, REVEAL (May 31, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/private--are-failingthose-who-need-help-the-most/ [https://perma.cc/4VLG-AQMK] (discussing criticisms of
diversion programs administered by a for-profit company).
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See Jonathan Simon, Is Mass Incarceration History?, 95 TX. L. REV. 1077, 1097–98
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independence is under greater strain when the prosecutor has been elected by
a populist movement.
The task of the Progressive Era prosecutors was to replace the corrupt
and incompetent uses of criminal authority by prosecutors controlled by
political machines. In contrast, today’s progressive prosecutors, although
also reformers, are not promoting wholesale change. While the progressive
prosecutors of this century share their predecessors’ concern for the broader
social context in which the criminal law is enforced, they do not make a
priority of improving the efficiency or professionalism of their staff, as did
the Progressive Era reformers. They seem instead to accept the expectations
of prosecutorial professionalism, including prosecutorial independence, that
are a legacy of the Progressive Era. Their emphasis is on the enunciation and
implementation of internal policies and practices—particularly those
promoting lenity through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect
to diversion, charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing——that, in their
view, better express the aspirations of the criminal justice process.
Thus, current progressive prosecutors do not see themselves as rejecting
or reinterpreting the principles of prosecutorial professionalism that they
inherited from their mainstream contemporaries. They can argue that their
reform agenda simply expresses their conviction that mainstream prosecutors
do not adequately meet professional expectations in practice, or that
mainstream prosecutors have not adequately applied general professional
norms to the particular social and criminal-justice problems of the day.
Progressive prosecutors’ innovations—even such sharp departures as the
wholesale diversion of certain classes of criminal cases out of the criminal
justice system—can largely be justified in terms of now-conventional
professional norms of prosecutorial discretion. They point to data to support
their argument that the concerns that all prosecutors share for the public
safety and the well-being of the community are better served, in certain
classes of cases, by alternatives to incarceration.228
But at the same time, there is a risk that—however newly-elected
prosecutors might rationalize their reform agendas—they will be tempted to
conform to the expectations of those who elected them to office. Many of
their constituents may focus more on the particular decisions made by
progressive prosecutors in individual cases than on whether the decisionmaking process is principled, fact based and data driven. Progressive
prosecutors’ challenge as elected officials will be, when professional
principles demand, to make unpopular as well as popular decisions, while
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See, e.g., supra note 202 (quoting Rachael Rollins’s policy memo).
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striving to preserve popular support. As the Progressive Era prosecutors
learned, that is no easy task.

